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Aviation Safety
Aviation is the design, development, production, operation, and use of aircraft.The
word ‘Aviation’ is derived from the Latin word avis which means bird. Safety is
the state of being "safe" (from French sauf), the condition of being protected against
physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, emotional, occupational, psychological,
educational or other types or consequences of failure, damage, error, accidents,
harm or any other event which could be considered non-desirable. Safety can also
be defined to be the control of recognized hazards to achieve an acceptable level
of risk. This can take the form of being protected from the event or from exposure
to something that causes health or economical losses. It can include protection
of people or of possessions.
Aviation safety means taking measures to prevent disasters or uninvited incidents
that can cause possible damage or losses in airports or planes .Aviation safety
is a vast context. It involves a lot of process from manpower to infrastructure.It
is important to know that we keep ourself aware of the safety measures to ensure
that others are safe too.
Safety and security goes hand in hand.We cannot be safe unless we are secure inorder
to provide security both landside and airside.There are a number of safety hazards
which we have to keep in mind while dealing with the safety measures. For instance
a cabin crew drinking before coming to work ,or a passenger carrying a lighter in
a plane are highly hazardous because a lighter tends to be highly flammable in a
high humidity.In the same manner a drunk pilot cannot ensure safety while performing
his duty.Infact ,it is important for him to double check if all the instruments
are operating fine making sure that the aircraft doesn’t have any damage in its
part before he takes off. Checking the identity card of a passenger before entering
the airport is also part of safety measures.
Below are some air safety hazards which can be looked into to keep ourselves alert.
In such scenarios it is important to keep ourselves alert on how to deal with it
if we come across such situations.
Misleading information and lack of Information : A pilot might fly the plane
in an accident-prone manner when misinformed by a printed document (manual, map
etc.), by reacting to a faulty instrument or indicator (either in cockpit or on
ground) or by following inaccurate instructions or information from flight or ground
control. Lack of information by the control tower, or delayed instructions, are
major factors contributing to accidents.
Lightning : Every aircraft has the ability to withstand normal lightning
strikes. The danger of a strong lightning was not understood until 1999, when a
glider was destroyed by it. Boeing 787 Dreamliner(US) is an example of a super-efficient
aircraft which was launch in December 15, 2009.Its built by an international team
of top aerospace using modern technologies and offers increased functionality and
efficiency.
Ice and Snow: Snowy and icy conditions are frequent contributors to airline
accidents. The icing of wings is another problem and measures have been developed
to combat it. Even a small amount of ice or coarse frost can greatly decrease the
ability of a wing to develop lift. This could prevent an aircraft from taking off.
Airlines and airports ensure that aircraft are properly de-iced(remove all the ice
from the surface)before takeoff whenever the weather threatens to create icing conditions(an
atmospheric conditions that can lead to the formation of water ice on the surfaces
of an aircraft, or within the engine). Modern airliners are designed to prevent
ice buildup on wings, engines, and tails (empennage) by either routing heated air
from jet engines through the leading edges of the wing, tail, and inlets, or on
slower aircraft, by use of inflatable rubber "boots" that expand and break off any
accumulated ice. Finally, airline dispatch offices keep watch on weather along the
routes of their flights, helping the pilots avoid the worst of inflight icing conditions.
Pilots can also be equipped with an ice detector in order to leave icy areas they
have flown into.
Engine Failure: An engine may fail to function because of fuel starvation(no
fuel), mechanical failure due to metal fatigue, improper maintenance, mechanical
failure caused by an original manufacturing defect in the engine or pilot error.
This brings out the importance to check once again all the necessary parts of the
plane.
Fire: Fire is another important measure that needs to be kept in mind while
dealing with safety measures.History has witnessed the fatal accidents and deaths
of number of people due to fire on board the aircraft and the toxic smoke generated,
a fire on the runway, wiring problems.
Bird strike: bird strike is an aviation term for a collision between a bird
and an aircraft. It is a common threat to aircraft safety and has caused a number
of fatal accidents. In 1988 an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 sucked pigeons into
both engines during take-off and then crashed in an attempt to return to the Bahir
Dar airport. In 1995, a Dassault Falcon 20 crashed at a Paris airport during an
emergency landing attempt after sucking lapwings into an engine, which caused an
engine failure and a fire in the airplane fuselage (an aircraft's main body section
that holds crew and passengers or cargo)
Ground damage: It is possible that a part of an aircraft gets damaged on
ground in the process of servicing.Damage may be in the form of simple scratches
in the paint or small dents in the skin. However, because aircraft structures (including
the outer skin) play such a critical role in the safe operation of a flight, all
damage is inspected, measured and possibly tested to ensure that any damage is within
safe tolerances.As we know that every little part of an aircraft are vital we cannot
miss even a small detail in the aircraft.
Human factors: A lot of things can be looked under this factor. Pilot error
and improper communication have often been factors in the collision of aircraft.
The ability of the flight crew to maintain situational awareness is a critical human
factor in air safety. Failure of the pilots to properly monitor the flight instruments
resulted in the crash of Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 in 1972 controlled flight
into terrain (CFIT), and error during take-off and landing can have catastrophic
consequences, for example cause the crash of Prinair Flight 191 on landing, also
in 1972. Flight crew members can also arrested or subject to disciplinary action
for being intoxicated on the job. Human factors incidents are not limited to errors
by the pilots. The failure to close a cargo door properly on Turkish Airlines Flight
981 in 1974 resulted in the loss of the aircraft - however the design of the cargo
door latch was also a major factor in the accident.
Controlled flight into terrain(CFIT): Controlled flight into terrain is a
class of accident in which an aircraft is flown, under control, into terrain or
man-made structures. CFIT accidents typically are a result of pilot error or of
navigational system error. Failure to protect Instrument Landing System critical
areas can also cause CFIT accidents. One of the most notable CFIT accidents was
in December 1995 in which American Airlines flight 965 tracked off course while
approaching Calí, Colombia and hit a mountainside after the speedbrakes were left
deployed despite an aural terrain warning in the cockpit and an attempt to gain
ample altitude in the nighttime conditions. Crew awareness and monitoring of navigational
systems can prevent or eliminate CFIT accidents. Crew Resource Management is a modern
method now widely used to improve the human factors of air safety. The Aviation
Safety Reporting System, or ASRS is another. Other technical aids can be used to
help pilots maintain situational awareness. A ground proximity warning system is
an on-board system that will alert a pilot if the aircraft is about to fly into
the ground. Also, air traffic controllers constantly monitor flights from the ground
and at airports.
Electromagnetic interference: The use of certain electronic equipment is
partially or entirely prohibited as it may interfere with aircraft operation, such
as causing compass deviations. Use of personal electronic devices and calculators
may be prohibited when an aircraft is below 10,000', taking off, or landing. The
American Federal Communications Commission (FCC) prohibits the use of a cell phone
on most flights, because in-flight usage creates problems with ground-based cells.
There is also concern about possible interference with aircraft navigation systems,
although that has never been proven to be a non-serious risk on airliners. A few
flights now allow use of cell phones, where the aircraft have been specially wired
and certified to meet both Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) and FCC regulations.
Runway safety: Types of runway safety incidents include:
- Runway excursion - an incident involving only a single aircraft, where it makes
an inappropriate exit from the runway.
- Runway overrun - a type of excursion where the aircraft is unable to stop before
the end of the runway (e.g. Air France Flight 358).
- Runway incursion - an incident involving incorrect presence of a vehicle, person
or another aircraft on the runway (e.g. Tenerife disaster).
- Runway confusion - an aircraft makes uses the wrong runway for landing or take-off
(e.g. Comair Flight 191).
Entry points to an airport, parking lot and drop off & pick up area requires surveillance
and security system deployment for real-time and remote monitoring of passengers
& vehicles in the premises and to avoid loitering and vandalism. Passenger Terminal
of an airport is the area which witnesses maximum activity and movement of people.
It includes Airline Counters, Check-in Counters, Security area, Waiting areas, shopping
areas, etc. Safety measures in such areas can help in avoiding an opportunity for
a terrorist to work on its assigned target.
References: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_safety
Aircraft maintenance
Aircraft maintenance is one of the most important subject when we talk about the
safety of an aircraft. Aircraft maintenance is the overhaul, repair, inspection
or modification of an aircraft or aircraft component.
Maintenance includes the installation or removal of a component from an aircraft
or aircraft subassembly, but does not include:-
- Elementary work, such as removing and replacing tires, inspection plates, spark
plugs, checking cylinder compression, etc.
- Servicing, such as refueling, washing windows.
- Any work done on an aircraft or aircraft component as part of the manufacturing
process, prior to issue of a certificate of airworthiness or other certification
document.
Maintenance may include such tasks as ensuring compliance with Airworthiness Directives
or Service Bulletins. Since aircraft maintenance is so important to safety, there
are even numerous Aircraft maintenance institutions which have been setup worldwide
which trains students to be certified airplane technicians. These mechanics works
with airplane manufacturers and airlines to build, repair, and inspect aircraft
to make sure they are safe for flight. Almost 200 aircraft maintenance schools across
the country provide two and four-year programs that cover engineering, mechanics,
electronics, plumbing, welding, and machining in a complete educational package.
Aircraft maintenance may be categorized into two:-
- Preventive Aircraft Maintenance, where equipment is maintained before break down
occurs. This type of maintenance has many different variations and is subject of
various researches to determine best and most efficient way to maintain equipment.
Recent studies have shown that Preventive maintenance is effective in preventing
age related failures of the equipment. For random failure patterns which amount
to 80% of the failure patterns, condition monitoring proves to be effective.
- Corrective Aircraft Maintenance, where equipment is maintained after break down.
This maintenance is often most expensive because worn equipment can damage other
parts and cause multiple damage.
Preventive aircraft maintenance
Preventive aircraft maintenance is maintenance performed in an attempt to avoid
failures, unnecessary production loss and safety violations. As equipment cannot
be maintained at all times, some way is needed to decide when it is proper to perform
maintenance. Normally, this is done by deciding some inspection/maintenance intervals,
and sticking to this interval more or less affected by what you find during these
activities. The result of this is that most of the maintenance performed is unnecessary
and it even adds substantial wear to the aircraft equipment. Also, you have no guarantee
that the equipment will continue to work even if you are maintaining it according
to the maintenance plan.
Corrective aircraft maintenance
Corrective aircraft maintenance is probably the most commonly used approach, but
it is easy to see its limitations. When aircraft equipment fails, it often leads
to downtime in production. In most cases this is a costly business. Also, if the
equipment needs to be replaced, the cost of replacing it alone can be substantial.
It is also important to consider health, safety and environment (HSE) issues related
to malfunctioning equipment.
Corrective aircraft maintenance can be defined as the maintenance which is required
when an item has failed or worn out, to bring it back to working order. Corrective
maintenance is carried out on all items where the consequences of failure or wearing
out are not significant and the cost of this maintenance is not greater than preventive
maintenance.
Aircraft maintenance is highly regulated. There are various airworthiness authorities
around the world. The major airworthiness authorities include:-
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Australia
- European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Europe
- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) United States
- Transport Canada (TC) Canada
- Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) India
At the completion of any maintenance task a person authorized by the national airworthiness
authority signs a release stating that "The described maintenance has been performed
in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements." In the case of a
certified aircraft this may be an Aircraft Maintenance Engineer or Aircraft Maintenance
Technician, while for amateur-built aircraft this may be the owner or builder of
the aircraft.
The maintenance of an aircraft mainly rests in the hands of the Aircraft Maintenance
Technicians and the Aircraft Maintenance Engineers with high responsibilities on
their shoulders. An aircraft maintenance technician, as used in the United States,
refers to an individual who holds a mechanic certificate issued by the Federal Aviation
Administration; the rules for certification, and for certificate-holders, are detailed
in Sub part D of Part 65 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's), which are
part of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Aircraft Maintenance Technicians
(AMT's) inspect and perform or supervise maintenance, preventive maintenance, and
alteration of aircraft and aircraft systems. In the US, aircraft maintenance technicians
usually refer to themselves as A&Ps, for airframe and powerplant mechanics.
The general requirements for eligibility for a mechanic certificate include the
following:
- Be 18 or older;
- Be able to read, speak, and understand English;
- Meet the experience or educational requirement; and
- Pass a set of required tests within a maximum of 24 months.
The required tests include, first, a set of knowledge tests; these are followed
by a practical test, which includes an oral examination component, and which is
administered by a Designated Mechanic Examiner (DME).
A person who fulfills the necessary requirements is issued a mechanic certificate
with either an airframe or powerplant rating, or both. It is these ratings which
together account for the common practice of referring to mechanics as "A&P's." Until
1952, instead of the Powerplant rating, an Engine rating was issued, so the abbreviation
"A&E" may appear in older documents.
Eligibility for the mechanic tests depends on the applicant's ability to document
their knowledge of required subject matter and ability to perform maintenance tasks.
The FAA recognizes two ways of demonstrating the needed knowledge and skills: Practical
experience or completion of a training program at a school certificated under Part
147 of the FAR's.
Aircraft Maintenance Checks:-
Aircraft maintenance checks are periodic checks that have to be done on all aircraft
after a certain amount of time or usage. Airlines and other commercial operators
of large or turbine-powered aircraft follow a continuous inspection program approved
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States, or by other airworthiness
authorities such as Transport Canada or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
Under FAA oversight, each operator prepares a Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance
Program (CAMP) under its Operations Specifications or "OpSpecs". The CAMP includes
both routine and detailed inspections. Airlines and airworthiness authorities casually
refer to the detailed inspections as "checks", commonly one of the following: A
check, B check, C check, or D check. A and B checks are lighter checks, while C
and D are considered heavier checks.
A Check
This is performed approximately every 500 - 800 flight hours. It is usually done
overnight at an airport gate. The actual occurrence of this check varies by aircraft
type, the cycle count (takeoff and landing is considered an aircraft "cycle"), or
the number of hours flown since the last check. The occurrence can be delayed by
the airline if certain predetermined conditions are met.
B Check
This is performed approximately every 3-6 months. It is usually done in 1-3 days
at an airport hangar. A similar occurrence schedule applies to the B check as to
the A check. B checks may be incorporated into successive A checks, ie: A-1 through
A-10 complete all the B check items.
C Check
This is performed approximately every 15–21 months or a specific amount of actual
Flight Hours (FH) as defined by the manufacturer. This maintenance check is more
extensive than a B Check, as pretty much the whole aircraft is inspected. This check
puts the aircraft out of service and until it is completed, the aircraft must not
leave the maintenance site. It also requires more space than A and B Checks - usually
a hangar at a maintenance base. The time needed to complete such a check is generally
1-2 weeks. The schedule of occurrence has many factors and components as has been
described, and thus varies by aircraft category and type.
D Check
This is - by far - the most comprehensive and demanding check for an airplane. It
is also known as a Heavy Maintenance Visit (HMV). This check occurs approximately
every 5–6 years. It is a check that, more or less, takes the entire airplane apart
for inspection and overhaul. Such a check can generally take from 3 weeks to 2 months,
depending on the aircraft and number of technicians involved (it is not uncommon
to have as many as 100 technicians working on a Boeing 747 at the same time). It
also requires the most space of all maintenance checks, and as such must be performed
at a suitable maintenance base.
Because of the nature and the cost of such a check, most airlines - especially those
with a large fleet - have to plan D Checks for their aircraft years in advance.
Often, older aircraft being phased out of a particular airline's fleet are stored
or scrapped upon reaching their next D Check, due to the high costs involved in
it in comparison to the aircraft's value. Many Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul
(MRO) shops state that it is virtually impossible to perform a D Check profitably
at a shop located within the United States. As such, only few of these shops offer
D checks.
Maintenance Review Board
Initial aircraft maintenance requirements are proposed in a Maintenance Review Board
(MRB) report based on Air Transport Association (ATA) publication MSG-3.
Modern transport category airplanes with MSG-3 derived maintenance programs employ
usage parameters for each maintenance requirement such as flight hours, calendar
time, or flight cycles. Maintenance intervals based on usage parameters allow more
flexibility in scheduling the maintenance program to optimize aircraft utilization
and minimize aircraft downtime.
DGCA compliances
India has been found to be fully compliant with the international safety standards
by an audit done by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the United States
of America. Before permitting a foreign airline to operate in the USA, FAA of US,
backed by the US legislation conducts an audit of the concerned country’s Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) / DGCA to ensure its capability for providing safety certification
and continuing oversight on its international carriers. The audit is conducted under
an ‘International Aviation Safety Assessment Programme’ (IASA) and focuses on the
country's ability to adhere to standards and recommended practices of International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for aircraft operations and maintenance.
Under the IASA programme, FAA in the year 1997 had conducted an audit of DGCA India
and had awarded Category 1 status to India. This year, in March 2009, FAA, based
on the report of an audit conducted by ICAO in October 2006, conducted a reassessment
of DGCA. While the FAA’s IASA team found India to be compliant in areas of aviation
legislation, operating regulations, civil aviation structure and safety oversight
functions, and licensing and certification obligations, it raised concerns in the
areas of adequate technical guidance for DGCA inspectors, hiring and retaining technical
personnel in DGCA, establishment of an on-going surveillance programme of air operators
and the resolution of identified safety issues.
DGCA was required to rectify the concerns in the identified areas in a short time
frame of about five months. Repercussions of non-action could have resulted in India
being downgraded to Category 2 status from the Category 1, which has been held by
India since 1997. Under Category 2, no expansion/ changes to the services of Indian
air carriers would have been permitted by USA and the existing operations would
have been subjected to ‘heightened FAA surveillance’. Such a downgrade would not
only have resulted to an economic impact to the nation but would also have been
a setback to India’s image worldwide in ICAO, EU, USA and in the international aviation
community.
The FAA IASA team revisited DGCA on 23rd September 2009, to confirm and validate
the action taken on the concerns since the audit in March 2009. The visit was also
made to ascertain the information which was provided to FAA by DGCA from time to
time in the previous few months on the progress made to make good the deficiencies.
During the discussions, the FAA team confirmed the action taken by DGCA to make
good the identified concerns of the earlier March 2009 audit.
Customer Safety
Customers are the most important people for any Organization. Customer, by extension
includes any entity that uses or experiences the services of another. A customer
may also be a viewer of the product or service that is being sold despite deciding
not to buy them. So, in this report we are focusing more on the Airline Customers
and their Safety. In fact, the first priority should be given to Customers’ Safety
when dealing with Air Transportation.
Safety : It literally is the state of being "safe “the condition of being
protected against physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, emotional,
occupational, psychological, educational or other types or consequences of failure,
damage, error, accidents, harm or any other event which could be considered non-desirable.
Safety can also be defined to be the control of recognized hazards to achieve an
acceptable level of risk. This can take the form of being protected from the event
or from exposure to something that causes health or economical losses. It can include
protection of people or of possessions.
Air Safety : It is a term encompassing the theory, investigation and categorization
of flight failures, and the prevention of such failures through regulation, education
and training. It can also be applied in the context of campaigns that inform the
public as to the safety of air travel.
In the 2nd Global Aviation Safety Conference, Abdul Wahab Al Roomi, director general
of the Department of Civil Aviation, Government of Sharjah has stated “Aviation
safety is a very important issue around the world,” says “As a civil aviation body;
aviation safety is amongst our top priorities here at Sharjah International Airport.
In fact, as a top priority, we have made a significant amount investment from our
overall budget and even brought in international consultants in order to become
the first airport in the UAE to have a GCAA approved Safety Management System. Such
an approval was given to us only after a series of strict audit procedures by the
GCAA.
“Furthermore, the Sharjah Department of Civil Aviation is committed to developing,
implementing and improving appropriate strategies, management systems and processes
to ensure that all our aviation activities uphold the highest level of safety performance
that is required in accordance with national and international standards.
Safety Measures for Airline Customers : Air travel is so safe you'll probably
never have to use any of the advice we're about to give you. But if you ever do
need it, this information could save your life. Airline passengers usually take
safety for granted when they board an airplane. They tune out the crew's pre-flight
announcements or reach for a magazine instead of the cards that show how to open
the emergency exit and what to do if the oxygen mask drops down. Because of this,
people may be needlessly hurt or killed in accidents they could survive. Every time
you board a plane, here are some things you should do :
- Carry-on bags must be properly stowed in overhead bins or under the seat in front
of you. Be careful about what you put into the storage bins over your seat. Their
doors may pop open during an accident or even a hard landing, spilling their contents.
Also, passengers in aisle seats have been injured by heavy items falling out of
these compartments when people are stowing or retrieving belongings at the beginning
or end of a flight.
- As soon as you sit down, fasten and unfasten your seat belt a couple of times. Watch
how it works. In an emergency you don't want to waste time fumbling with the buckle.
- Before take-off, there will be a briefing about safety procedures, pointing out
emergency exits and explaining seat belts, life vests and oxygen masks. Listen carefully
and if there's anything you don't understand ask the flight attendants for help.
The plastic card in the seat pocket in front of you will review some of the safety
information announced by the flight attendant. Read it. It also tells you about
emergency exits and how to find and use emergency equipment such as oxygen masks.
As you're reading the card look for your closest emergency exit, and count the number
of rows between yourself and this exit. Remember, the closest exit may be behind
you. Have a second escape route planned in case the nearest exit is blocked. This
is important because people sometimes head for the door they used to board the plane,
usually in the front of the first class cabin. This wastes time and blocks the aisles.
If the oxygen masks should drop, you must tug the plastic tube slightly to get the
oxygen flowing. If you don't understand the instructions about how the mask works,
ask a flight attendant to explain them to you.
When the plane is safely in the air, the pilot usually turns off the "fasten seat
belt" sign. He or she usually suggests that passengers keep their belts buckled
anyway during the flight in case the plane hits rough air. This is a good idea;
there have been a number of instances of unexpected turbulence in which unbelted
passengers were seriously injured and even killed when they were thrown about the
cabin. Just as seat belts should always be worn in cars, in airplanes they should
always be fastened when you are in your seat.
If you are ever in an aviation accident, you should remember these things:
- Stay calm.
- Listen to the crew members and do what they say. The cabin crew's most important
job is to help you evacuate safely.
- Before you try to open any emergency exit yourself, look outside the window. If
you see a fire outside the door, don't open it or the flames may spread into the
cabin. Try to use your alternate escape route.
- Remember, smoke rises. So try to stay down if there's smoke in the cabin. Follow
the track of emergency lights embedded in the floor; they lead to an exit. If you
have a cloth, put it over your nose and mouth.
- After an air accident, the National Transportation Safety Board always talks to
survivors to try to learn why they were able to make it through safely. They've
discovered that, as a rule, it does help to be prepared. Avoiding serious injury
or surviving an air accident isn't just a matter of luck; it's also a matter of
being informed and thinking ahead.
- Are you one of those people who jumps up while the aircraft is still taxiing, gathers
up coat, suitcase and briefcase, and gets ready to sprint? If so, resist the urge.
Planes sometimes make sudden stops when they are taxiing to the airport gate, and
passengers have been injured when they were thrown onto a seat back or the edge
of a door of an overhead bin. Stay in your seat with your belt buckled until the
plane comes to a complete halt and the 'fasten seat belt' sign is turned off.
- Never smoke in airplane restrooms. Smoking was banned there after an accident killed
116 people in only 4 minutes, apparently because a careless smoker left a burning
cigarette butt in the trash bin. There is a steep fine for disabling a lavatory
smoke detector.
Top 10 Airline Safety Questions :
- Where is the safest place to sit on an airplane?
The short answer is there is no safest seat. In an aircraft accident where the plane
is seriously damaged or one or more occupants are injured or killed, the severity
of the injuries depends on many factors, some of which may not be apparent until
an accident occurs. For example, there have been many accidents involving heavy
smoke or fire where survival depended on the ability of the passengers to not panic
and to quickly remove themselves and others from the aircraft after landing. Dr.
Todd Curtis of AirSafe.com answered the question about the safest seat on an airplane
more fully in an article at AirSafeNews.com
- Which is the safest airline to fly?
Clearly there are some major airlines such as southwest of the USA which have not
had a passenger die in an accident and others such as United Airlines and Korean
Air which have had several fatal events. Those facts don't make one airline automatically
safer than the other although it does affect the public's perception of safety.
The most important indicator of the overall safety of an airline is how it is regulated
by its nation's civil aviation authority. Airlines operating large capacity passenger
aircraft in the major industrialized countries have to follow the strictest safety
regulations. While the airlines operating smaller capacity aircraft have the choice
of operating under the same rules, these smaller aircraft are not certified to the
same standards as larger ones. Just as importantly, the airports and air traffic
control system have to adhere to similarly high standards. Beyond that, use your
good common sense. If an airline is notorious for poor on time performance, lots
of passenger complaints, and severe financial problems, then perhaps it is time
to find an alternative airline. While there are some airlines with no fatal plane
crashes, it doesn't mean that these airlines are safe, since fatal crashes are very
rare for airlines of every size.
- Which aircraft model is the safest?
In general, all aircraft in a particular class have to adhere to the same set of
standards. When safety concerns arise because of one or more accidents associated
with a particular model, the civil aviation authorities of the major industrialized
countries will usually require that the issue be addressed in all relevant aircraft
models. For example, fatal airline accidents due to wind shear in the 1970s and
1980s in the U.S. led to a number of innovations in aircraft and ground wind shear
detection systems and also in flight crew training which has led to a reduction
in the risk of accidents from that weather issue. While accidents of any kind are
rare, you can get a better idea of how safe an aircraft model is by comparing how
often passengers die in a plane crash involving that particular aircraft model.
- What kind of emergency am I most likely to face?
For every accident, there are dozens, even hundreds of unusual circumstances that
can happen during a flight. For a passenger, the most likely emergencies that you
will face where you will have to do something is an evacuation of the aircraft using
the emergency slides or using the emergency oxygen system. In most cases, the evacuation
is ordered as a precautionary measure, not because the passengers face imminent
danger. Emergency oxygen masks may be deployed automatically or be deployed manually
by the flight crew. In most cases, deployment of the masks does not indicate that
the passengers are in imminent danger. For an example of an emergency evacuation
that went very well, you can check out this 2005 Air France crash in Toronto where
all the passengers escaped from a burning aircraft.
- How should I prepare to face these two situations?
In the case of evacuation by the emergency slides, the best preparation is to be
familiar with the location of the exits, be ready to follow the commands of the
flight and cabin crew, and to wear slide friendly clothes. Specifically, high heeled
shoes may cause the slide to rip, so if you have them on, take them off before leaving
your seat. In the case of deployment of emergency oxygen, your first priority is
to put on your own mask. If the cabin is depressurized, you face the risk of loss
of consciousness. Putting on your mask first decreases the risk of your passing
out before having the opportunity to help your children or other passengers with
their oxygen masks.
- If the plane crashes, don't most people die?
One can argue this question several ways. Based on a review of accidents between
1978 and 1995 with at least one fatality to a passenger, there were a total of 164
fatal accidents involving large jet transports designed in Western Europe or the
U.S. In 68 cases, all passengers died and in 15 others between 90% and 100% of the
passengers died. In 37 cases less than 10% of the passengers died. Among propeller
driven aircraft, there were 178 events involving aircraft designed outside of the
former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. Of those, all were killed in 108 cases,
between 90% and 100% in six cases, and less than 10% in nine cases. Another way
to look at this is through the AirSafe.com method for evaluating plane crash survivor
rates, where the estimated fatal crash rate is reduced if there are surviving passengers.
For example, a crash where all passengers die is counted as one event, and if there
were 50% survivors, it counts as half of an event.
- Who decides on what changes are made for safety?
In general, the civil aviation authorities of several key countries, primarily the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France, take the lead on making changes in
areas such aircraft design, aircraft operation, and pilot training. Other major
industrial nations have civil aviation authorities that have regulations and requirements
similar to the leading countries. In the rest of the world, the International Civil
Aviation Organization plays a similar influential role. You can check out some of
the other organizations responsible for airline and aviation safety.
- Who investigates airline accidents?
In most cases, formal airline accident investigations are the responsibility of
either the nation where the accident occurred or by the nation where the aircraft
was registered. Depending on the accident, any number of organizations has a major
role in the investigation. Typically in the United States, an accident in U.S. territory
involving a U.S. registered aircraft would have the following groups directly involved
in the accident investigation and analysis: the U.S. National Transportation Safety
Board, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the airline operating the accident
aircraft, the aircraft manufacturer, and the engine manufacturer. If the accident
involved sabotage or hijacking, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation would also
be involved. The NTSB is focused on more serious events, and they have detailed
regulations that define what an aircraft accident is.
- Is flying getting safer or less safe today compared with 10 or 20 years ago?
In the last fifteen years or so, the fatal accident rate for passenger aircraft
has not significantly changed. What has changed is the number of flights performed
around the world, more than doubling during that same time. If you look at the accident
rate, things haven't changed much. If look at the number of accidents, the amount
of media coverage, and level of public concern, then flying may seem either more
or less safe depending on how much attention is paid by the world media. For example,
over a period of about seven weeks in August and September 2005, there were a total
of eight events that resulted either in significant numbers of fatalities or were
spectacular events that involved no fatalities but that generated intense worldwide
media attention. Overall, 2005 had an average number of fatal events, but during
those two months there were a heightened awareness of safety on the part of the
general public. One problem with talking about safety is that different people use
different definitions. At AirSafe.com, safety can't be measured with numbers, but
risk can be measured. Check out this description of the differences between risk
and safety to get a better understanding of how this site deals with safety questions.
- How often do airliners crash?
Serious airline crashes that kill passengers are rare. Since AirSafe began tracking
these kinds of events in 1996, there have been as few as seven events with passenger
fatalities in 2008, and as many as 19 crashes and other events with passenger fatalities
in 1997 . These numbers include deaths due to deliberate actions such as airliner
hijackings, or acts of sabotage or terror, and crashes involving small airliners
in all parts of the world. Crashes are much less common in the largest industrialized
countries. For example, for the five years from 2005 to 2009, AirSafe.com lists
43 crashes and other events that killed at least one airline passenger. Airlines
from the US, Canada, the European Community, Australia, and Japan were responsible
for about three quarters of all airline traffic, but less than one quarter of the
fatal events (9 of 43) took place in those countries or involved an airline based
in those countries.
http://airconsumer.dot.gov/publications/flyrights.htm
http://www.airsafe.com/ten_faq.htm
Latest Technologies
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Alaska Airlines Pioneers: New Technology for Preventing
Runway Accidents
Alaska Airlines is the first US airline to implement the Runway Awareness and Advisory
System. The new system uses GPS technology to track an aircraft's ground movements
for runway safety, and automatically issues warnings to pilots if they are entering
the wrong taxiway or runway. read more
The Problem : Seen from ground level, the ramps, taxiways, and runways of
a large airport are confusing to navigate around. It is notoriously easy for pilots
to become disoriented and to turn the wrong way, even if they have a map in front
of them. Unlike the environment in which cars drive, where roads are isolated strips
of pavements, the taxiways at many airports are simply painted onto a single large
paved area called a tarmac.
Taxing is similar to driving around a large parking lot. Depending upon the lighting,
and the number of other cars around, it can be difficult to see where the lanes
are, causing some drivers to head across the lanes or to drive in the wrong direction
down the isles. Airports do have the advantage of standardized signs that identify
taxiways, intersections, and runways, however, unlike roads, there are no traffic
lights, or even stop signs. Instead, pilots must rely on controllers to manage the
traffic flow.
Taxiway mishaps do occur, and sometimes result in minor "wing dings." After all,
the speed limits on taxiways are usually quite low. Runway incidents tend to be
more serious, and often result in tragedy. A prime example was ComAir flight 5191
at Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky. Early in the morning of August 27,
2006, before daylight, the crew completed their pre-flight preparations, contacted
ground control, and began taxing their CRJ-100 jet to the departure runway. Unfortunately,
they made a wrong turn, which neither the controller, nor the crew caught. As a
result, the crew attempted to take off on the wrong runway, a runway that was much
shorter than the one they believed they were using. It was a runway intended for
small propeller planes, and not for jets. The plane was still accelerating when
it ran off the end of the runway, momentarily climbed into the air, and crashed
into an adjacent stand of trees. The crew never even knew what happened. All of
the 47 passengers and two of the crew lost their lives. The only survivor was the
First Officer (Copilot), who suffered severe injuries, including brain damage.
The Solution : Honeywell has developed a software product with the goal of
preventing this type of tragedy from happening again. The Runway Advisory and Awareness
System (RAAS) is a software package that works with the Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning System already installed on most airliners. Using GPS data, RAAS is specifically
designed to aircraft track movements on the ground in reference to the taxiway and
runway layout of specific airports. The system alerts pilots each time they turn
onto a new taxiway or runway, and verbally identifies the taxiway or runway they
are on. Moreover, if an aircraft begins to accelerate to takeoff on a taxiway, or
on the wrong runway, the crew will be immediately alerted.
Alaska Airlines is the first U.S. carrier to deploy this technology on its entire
fleet. According to press releases, Alaska Airlines worked closely with Honeywell
in development, and helped test the system over the last three years.
Only the First Step : RAAS is only the first step in using new technology
to avoid runway and taxiway accidents. A new ground radar system is being developed
by Sensis Corp that will automatically alert air traffic controllers when an aircraft
ventures where it should not go. This radar system is designed to communicate directly
with the RAAS systems on individual aircraft, so that potential collisions can be
identified before they occur. The Sensis ground radar is scheduled to be installed
at many U.S. airports in the near future.
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Rutan and Branson Unveil Virgin Galactic Mothership
- White Knight Two
Burt Rutan and Sir Richard Branson have moved one step closer to launching the world's
first commercial space tourism service. On July 28, 2008, the press and customers
got their first glimpse of White Knight Two, the plane that will carry the Virgin
Galactic spaceship to launch altitude. The Rollout Ceremony
Over 100 prepaid future space travellers flew to the Mojave Spaceport in California
on board a specially painted Virgin America A320 to attend the rollout of WhiteKnightTwo,
the airplane that will eventually carry them on the first stage of their journey
into the Earth's upper atmosphere. According to the press release from Virgin Galactic,
the event was also attended by representatives of the press, and a variety of VIPs.
The aircraft's designer, Burt Rutan, and Sir Richard Branson who founded Virgin
Galactic both attended the ceremony. The sleek and exotic looking airplane was christened
"Eve", in honor of Branson's mother who has been both a flight attendant and a pilot.
WhiteKnightTwo : The name Burt Rutan has been associated with innovative,
ultra-efficient, non-traditional airplane designs for decades. In that vein, WhiteKnightTwo
(WK2) certainly does not disappoint. Even the name, spelled as a single word, seems
to represent an aggressively modern Internet-age point of view. The airplane is
a major step forward from its prototype, called White Knight, which was the mothership
for Space Ship One.
The WK2 airframe is constructed entirely from carbon fiber composite, an ultra light,
ultra strong fiberglass-like material that has become an increasingly popular material
for building aircraft parts in recent years. WK2 employs a double fuselage design,
distantly reminiscent of exotic WWII fighter designs like the North American F-82
Twin Mustang and the Messerschmitt Bf-109Z. The twin fuselages are hung beneath
a majestic 140-foot wing that sets a new record for being the largest single-piece
composite aircraft part in the world. The launch vehicle, SpaceShipTwo will be mounted
in the center, between the fuselages. WK2 is powered by four P&W 308A jet engines,
mounted on the outboard wing sections.
During the rollout ceremony, Rutan was quick to point out that WhiteKnightTwo is
a highly versatile plane, and that it has the potential to serve multiple roles.
According to the press release, the lift capability of WK2 exceeds Virgin Galactic's
lift capability requirements by over 30%, and has a maximum altitude of 50,000 feet.
It is also capable of flying coast to coast across the U.S., non-stop. Rutan revealed
a vision for the aircraft's future well beyond the Virgin Galactic mission, suggesting
that additional vehicles could be produced and sold to customers in need of a way
to launch various types of spacecraft.
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Supersonic Transports : A Concorde for the 21st Century?
- Stoneforger
The Concorde is an aviation icon, a legend, a testament to the belief man can conquer
the skies and beyond. But sadly, it doesn't fly anymore. How did we get to that
point, and what does the future hold for supersonic travel?
The Early Days :Ever since man gained the ability to fly, he kept pushing
the envelope, going higher, longer, faster. The sound barrier was broken and a renaissance
of aviation ensued: jet engines made mass aerial transportation cheap and fast enough
for the majority of people. At the same time, records were being repeatedly broken
by the fledgling NASA and the Air Force, each for their own purposes.
Aircrafts like the iconic X-15 (still holding the record for fastest manned aircraft)
were instrumental in understanding the mechanics of supersonic flight at higher
Mach numbers (the X-15 record is Mach 6.7). A lesser known aircraft, the XB-70 Valkyrie,
was a huge leap in sustained controlled supersonic flight, since it demonstrated
the capacity to fly at Mach 3 continuously, with a significant payload and range.
The Civilians : The techniques, ideas, and materials developed for the XB-70
Valkyrie,which was abandoned due to funding problems and the shift to using ICBMs
(Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) as a more practical solution for strategic
nuclear bombing, made a commercial supersonic aircraft a viable idea. NASA started
work on a SST (Supersonic Transport) space plane using the remaining XB-70 as a
test-bed vehicle, but by that time the Concorde program had already begun, and soon
the Soviets followed.
Eventually, NASA was denied further funding for the SST project, but both the Concorde
and its Russian counterpart, the Tu-144, made it into production. From then on though,
things became difficult for both SSTs, since the Tu-144 only made 55 scheduled flights
with Aeroflot before being withdrawn from service in 1979. Concorde had a longer
but still troubled life, with both operators, Air France and British Airways, struggling
to make a profit out of the aircraft.
The Concorde, a Successful Failure : When it comes to grant ventures such
as supersonic commercial transportation, being the fastest at any cost has no place
in the aviation industry. It is all fine and well for a government to fund projects
such as the XB-70 and the SR-71, but such aircrafts fill niche roles, with very
specific flight profiles.
It seems that Aerospatiale and BaE were so overtaken by sheer enthusiasm at the
prospect of producing a commercial supersonic passenger aircraft that they forgot
to ask airlines how much they were willing to pay, and in the end only the government-owned
airlines of France and the U.K. were practically forced to operate the aircraft,
merely to save some political face. British Airways managed to turn in a small profit
overall but Air France was significantly hurt by the Concorde.
A complicated sum of political and financial factors, as well as a small witch hunt
about the effects of the Concorde on the ozone as well as its sonic boom effect,
made operating the aircraft a nightmare. The Tu-144 never experienced the same amount
of problems mainly due to its much more brief and constrained operational life.
Reasons for Failure : The SSTs fill a niche role in the aviation industry,
flying people across oceans in a few hours. They can be operated with a small profit
margin, but at the correct timing. Even if the Concorde flights had not been discontinued
in 2003, they would eventually be hammered by the oil prices, because other aircraft
can be rerouted, the fare policies changed, and a host of other tricks can be performed
by airlines to minimize damages.
But an SST is a high cost, high maintenance, low profit business, since its passenger
target group is so small that it cannot guarantee a minimum and stable income for
the airline, especially when it is almost impossible to offer both Mach speeds and
Jumbo ranges. In view of this, the SST seems altogether a bad idea, if you also
take into account that the Internet has made the world a smaller place in many ways.
Most business can be now conducted without crossing the Atlantic, and airfares are
becoming cheaper by using more efficient engines and aircraft designs. An SST right
now would not be an exciting new supersonic way to fly, but a retro oddity. Still,
the idea is being tossed around from time to time by various companies and agencies,
re-emerging in various forms.
What now? : The cancelled High Speed Civil Transport, the proposed A2 and
the associated european LAPCAT and ESRP programs, the Japanese Next Generation Supersonic
Transport, the russian Tu-242 (in danger of being cancelled) have a very bad thing
in common: they they take in no account whether the aviation industry needs or will
need an SST by the time it is ready to fly, within the next decade. Most importantly
these programs lack serious funding, and the SST concept is largely on life support.
Even if new experimental technologies make their way into real production, like
pulse detonation engines, and SABRE engines (the Scimitar engine predominantly),
with the resulting designs being able to achieve hypersonic flight and almost becoming
SSTOs (Single Stage To Orbit), the perennial and true spaceplane (another unfortunate
chain of failed and canceled projects), all the airlines will eventually ask for
is the aircraft's TCO and profit margin.
What Might Work : The only possibly viable SST idea are SSBJs (SuperSonic
Business Jets), which makes sense since large businesses and corporations usually
employ private jets and might just be interested in a supersonic jet for selected
flights of their choosing. And the sonic boom problem that plagued the Concorde
and restricted its routes and flight paths has been proven to be halved with certain
elongated fuselage designs, and is much less of a concern in a small business jet.
In essence, we are not going to see a successor to the Concorde for at least two
decades, and it still remains unknown whether the technology will have improved
sufficiently so as to lower operating costs enough to attract sales from airlines
which increasingly prefer aircaft with larger capacity and less operating cost (fuel
and maintenance).
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Airline propagates latest-technology turboprop solution
to reducing aviation emissions
Fast-growing Irish regional airline Aer Arann recently invested 180 million euros
in a new fleet of ATR 72-500s and by 2009 the aircraft type will make up the entire
Aer Arann fleet. The airline highlights that for a journey of less than 600 nautical
miles, or 90 minutes flying time, a turboprop uses up to 70% less fuel than a similar-sized
jet, emits 20% less CO2 per passenger-km than newer jets and produces three times
less NOx than a car and 40% less than a train.
“Aer Arann planes uses less fuel to fly 230 miles than a jumbo jet guzzles on a
runway – turboprop power is a revolution in air travel that makes environmental
sense,” it says.
Colin Lewis, Head of Sales and Marketing at Aer Arann comments: “Once condemned
for the relatively noisy and bumpy ride it offered passengers, the ATR is a popular
equivalent to regional jets. They are more fuel efficient, the new planes are quieter
and they are extremely reliable. I expect to see a large percentage of the airline
industry moving back to propeller planes over the next five years.”
Garry Cullen, Managing Director says: “Aer Arann is committed to the principles
of energy efficiency. Whilst the contribution of the aviation industry towards global
warming is significantly less than other large polluters, our new ATR aircraft are
recognized as the most fuel efficient aircraft in their category.
“The ATR operates more efficiently than jet aircraft on short-haul routes – up to
70% less fuel is required than a 737 on a typical Aer Arann sector. On a 370km sector,
the ATR 72-500 fuel consumption per passenger is up to 15% lower than a typical
European car. The associated ATR gaseous emissions per passenger in terms of CO2
are 15 times less than a car and comparable to a train.”
The aircraft manufacturer says its latest propulsion technology, combined with optimally
designed high-lift systems, ensures the plane meets ICAO noise requirements with
wide margins.
A representative at Toulouse-based ATR says: “Turboprop aircraft are currently outselling
regional jets. Overall, the impact that the rising cost of oil is having on airline
profits has helped to lift turboprop sales to about 400 last year, compared with
about 250 jets in the same size bracket. We expect to see sales to continue to rise
significantly as currently there is no other alternative to the ATR in the market
place.”
ATR announced last October the launch of the -600 series, with first deliveries
expected in the second half of 2010.
Articles
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The Shifting Sands of Passenger Rights
By: Andrew Compart, Washington|Apr 22, 2011
Airlines in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere are confronting sweeping new U.S. regulations
on how they sell tickets, advertise their prices, disclose fee-based optional services,
compensate customers and operate flights.
On the surface, this trend toward re-regulation of customer services seems to present
a challenge for airlines, today and going forward. However, there are signs that
regulators in the U.S. and Europe are having second thoughts about how far their
rules should go, providing hope to airlines that their arguments for government
restraint and greater reliance on market forces are having some impact.
The messages seem contradictory but are suggested by the second round of rules on
passenger “protections” just issued by the U.S. Transportation Department. Many
of the rules will impact not only home-country carriers but also any foreign airline
that operates to the U.S. or sells tickets to U.S. customers. They cover issues
such as tarmac delays, fee disclosure, baggage fee consistency, fare advertising,
denied-boarding compensation and 24-hr. reservation holds.
U.S. airlines, though, can celebrate some victories—or at least breathe a sigh of
relief until another battle is enjoined next year.
The department cedes to the airlines on one important issue: They will not be compelled
to include customer service and tarmac delay commitments in their contracts of carriage,
as originally proposed. That would have made the promises legally binding and potentially
subjected carriers to a flood of civil lawsuits.
And the department puts off, until late 2011 and 2012, the fight over a second issue
the airlines consider critical: whether it should tell carriers how to market optional
services such as checked baggage fees, preferred seating and inflight Wi-Fi.
Those two concessions are likely why U.S. airlines reacted so nonchalantly to the
comprehensive new rules, which to them must seem contrary to the airline industry
deregulation of 1978.
American Airlines Chairman and CEO Gerard Arpey, for example, says there is “nothing
particularly alarming” about the rules. The Air Transport Association, the largest
trade group for U.S. carriers, says “market forces—not additional regulations—are
already providing customer benefits.” But it adds that “our member airlines will
implement the new rules as efficiently as possible.”
The rules may be a bigger concern to non-U.S. carriers, which had argued that the
department was overstepping its legal bounds in proposing to apply most of the new
rules to them. In its final rulemaking, the department largely rejected their claims
of extraterritoriality.
The International Air Transport Association says, “this intervention into international
airline business practices will result in increased cancellations, higher ticket
prices and greater inconvenience for passengers.”
The new rules could prove particularly nettlesome for European carriers, which are
still fighting their own battles with European regulators.
The airlines have been furious over existing European Commission rules, especially
regarding what they must do for passengers in the event of cancellations and long
delays, arguing that they bear a disproportionate financial burden when flights
are disrupted for reasons outside of their control. But the airlines are making
some inroads: The EC effectively acknowledges that the current situation is not
perfect, and it is reviewing the rules with the intent of issuing a new proposal
next year.
“We cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the lessons learned from what passengers
and industry suffered during the 2010 ash crisis and snow,” EC Transport Commissioner
Siim Kallas says. European airlines say Regulation 261 cost them millions of euros
during the airspace shutdown due to volcanic ash a year ago and severe snow conditions
at year-end. Ryanair has implemented a €2 ($3) per-ticket fee to regain some money
spent on passenger hotels and food.
Although the new U.S. regulations should not cost them—or U.S. carriers—that much,
the extent of the regulations’ impact remains to be determined.
For example, the new rules will double the minimum compensation airlines must pay
to passengers who are bumped involuntarily from flights, and substantially raise
the maximums and adjust them for inflation biennially. That will not affect many
U.S. passengers in relative terms—about 58,000 received denied boarding compensation
in 2009, or 0.01% of all passengers. But it could force airlines to raise their
offers to entice travelers to voluntarily give up their seats.
The 3-hr. tarmac delay time limit the department placed on U.S. airline domestic
flights at large and medium-size airports will be expanded to all airports, and
a new 4-hr. time limit has been created for U.S. and foreign airline international
flights at U.S. airports. But the ultimate cost of that is difficult to quantify.
U.S. and foreign carriers must disclose changes in baggage fees and allowances on
their homepage for three months via a hyperlink to a page listing the changes, and
provide a homepage link to a listing of all of their ancillary fees. That could
affect consumer purchasing choices, but the cost of web page reprogramming and redesign
will be minimal.
On full-fare advertising, the department is reversing more than two decades of policy
and reverting to the letter of U.S. law by requiring airlines to include all government-imposed
taxes and fees in advertised fares. Carriers now can list some of those separately
as a footnote to the fare, including passenger facility charges (PFC) that vary
by airport. Including them in the advertised price could have an impact on ticket
sales for flights with multiple legs (on which the flight segment tax would be higher)
or those departing from or connecting through airports with higher PFCs.
Regarding the selling of tickets, the department says airlines must let customers
hold a quoted fare without payment—or without penalty for cancellation—for at least
24 hr. after the reservation is made. But the department lessened the potential
impact on carriers, which warn it could cost them close-in bookings, by stipulating
that the requirement applies only to reservations made a week or more prior to the
flight’s scheduled departure.
“Airline passengers have a right to be treated fairly,” Transportation Secretary
Ray LaHood declared April 20, the day the department released its newest round of
rules.
"We believe that our action strikes a proper balance between ensuring that the traveling
public is provided an adequate level of service and is not subjected to unfair or
deceptive practices, while ensuring the marketplace governs to the extent possible,"
the department says.
The department consistently rejected foreign airlines’ complaints that the U.S.
does not have jurisdiction to apply certain rules to them. For example, the department
says it will require virtually all foreign carriers operating scheduled services
to and from the U.S. to adopt customer service plans with “commitments” on issues
such as ticket and baggage fee refunds and reservation holds.
The department says it is “ensuring that these requirements do not involve an extraterritorial
application of U.S. law by limiting their application to foreign carriers to flights
to and from the U.S., sales made within the U.S., and to the conduct of foreign
carriers on U.S. soil.”
For U.S. carriers, the bigger battle will ensue in 2012 and will test how much their
argument for limits on government intervention are taking hold. The department deferred
a decision about mandating that carriers provide their pricing data on ancillary
options such as checked baggage, preferred seats and inflight Wi-Fi to any GDS in
which they participate. Such a rule could benefit online travel agencies, too, since
many obtain their data from a GDS.
Instead, the department says it is planning to issue a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking in December that will require ancillary fees to be displayed at all points
of sale. The department says the supplemental rulemaking will seek to determine
the best method for making information about optional services and associated fees
available to the consumer.
In the final rule issued April 20 to expand “passenger protections,” as the department
calls them, it notes the potential value to consumers of mandating that airlines
provide the ancillary fee data to GDS providers.
Various groups representing consumers, business travelers, travel agents and corporate
travel managers have argued and lobbied for the requirement, which they say is needed
so customers who rely on travel agents, corporate travel departments and corporate
booking tools can readily compare an all-inclusive price—and so travel managers
can more readily track spending. And the Transportation Department elsewhere in
the rulemaking says it believes it is “difficult currently for consumers to effectively
comparison shop and determine the total cost for travel, including ancillary fees
for optional services.”
The department, however, also acknowledges the legitimacy of the objections raised
by most airlines.
“The department is cognizant that some parties feel that requiring carriers to provide
information on their ancillary fees to GDS would be a reasonable way, if not the
best way, to ensure consumers can easily comparison shop for air fares,” the department
says, but “cannot at this time agree that it is in the public interest to mandate
that step, since we lack information critical to a decision on the issue.”
The department also states that, “in order to permit us time to obtain additional
information about costs, benefits and consequences of requiring U.S. and foreign
carriers to provide ancillary fee information to GDS, including those involving
competition, the department is deferring final action on this matter. The department
wants to ensure that any action it takes does not have unintended consequences,
particularly given the sensitive nature of the market and the negotiations currently
taking place between carriers and the GDS.”
Many of the biggest U.S. airlines say they want to force GDS to lower their booking
fees in exchange for access to the airlines’ pricing data on optional services.
The carriers describe it as “one of the few bargaining chips available to compel
GDS to reduce their unreasonably high fees.”
Critics of the airlines’ stance argue that the carriers also prefer a lack of transparency
in comparing fees and all-in pricing, as it could force them to lower some of the
fees to remain competitive.
With Robert Wall in London.
Photo Credit: EPA/Landov
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BIAL - A new start in Indian aviation
The new greenfield Bangalore International Airport at Devanahalli will put Bangalore
city on the global destination map and will offer travellers facilities comparable
with the best international airports. The Airport is envisioned to meet the growing
aviation needs of the city through the development of a passenger friendly, well
operated and financially sound airport. Mr Albert Brunner, CEO, Bangalore International
Airport Ltd. talks to AviationWatch about the developments at ground zero and his
plans to make it a truly world class airport.
Why does Bangalore need an international airport?
Bangalore does have an airport. However, the existing Bangalore airport is located
within city limits and suffers severe limitations for expansion of both airside
and landside facilities. These constraints do not allow expansion of the airport.
In order to keep pace with the rapid development in Bangalore as India's leader
in information technology, biotechnology and the services industry, the Government
of Karnataka and the Airports Authority of India initiated the greenfield airport
project north of Bangalore. Bangalore's current airport is the fourth largest in
India. BIAL, when completed, will be the first international airport in India built,
owned and operated by a public limited company with a majority of private shareholders.
The financial close was reached at the end of June 2005; construction began on 2nd
July 2005 and will last, including the testing phase, for 33 months. The new Bangalore
International Airport is estimated to open for commercial operations on April 2,
2008.
What is the current state of construction?
It is twenty months since the construction at the new greenfield site started and
it is now nearing 60% completion as we speak. Currently the entire project work
is in progress i.e. the Terminal building, the Air traffic control (ATC) & technical
block, runway, apron and taxiway and all the other ancillary buildings. It is important
for me to point out here that building a new private greenfield airport in India
is much more than a construction project. It means setting up of an unprecedented
legal framework, coping with huge time pressure, recruiting and training personnel
from a large talent pool with limited experience in airport management. It also
requires selection of partners like flight caterers, ground handlers and dutyfree
& retailers etc., who are willing and able to provide service according to the highest
international standards. The opening of Bangalore International Airport represents
a new start in Indian Aviation with regard to the experience of the passenger on
the ground. Bangalore, being the Silicon Valley of India and probably the most modern
and multicultural city of India, shall have an airport that stands for the new modern
and international India, proud of its culture and history, but part of the global
economy.
What will the airport's capacity be?
The new airport will be able to handle 11 million passengers annually. This project
will cost approximately Indian Rupees 1930 crores, which is equivalent to approx.
US $ 430 mio with added investment of approx. Indian Rupees 750 crores made by selected
concessionaires. The Master Plan of the new Bangalore International Airport has
been developed to fulfil the need for an operationally efficient and passenger friendly
airport for Bangalore. It ensures that the size and capacity of the airport facilities
can be gradually expanded based on the passenger and cargo growth. The land at our
disposal allows us to develop the airport up to a capacity of approximately 50 million
passengers a year. The Master Plan not only includes provision of premium land for
commercial real estate developments such as office parks, retail, entertainment
and hospitality but also land reserve for a rail link to the city.
How will it compare to other international airports in India and around the world?
BIAL will aim to make the new Bangalore International Airport one of the best airports
in India. BIAL is truly passenger focused. For example, passengers will be able
to transfer between domestic and international flights under one roof. Furthermore,
we are one of the first airports in India to have a first class Business hotel within
walking distance from the terminal building. We will also have a leisure and entertainment
area for "meeters and greeters". Passenger experience should combine business and
leisure, therefore it is part of our vision to develop 215 acres of commercial real
estate for the airport city. It will house business centers, entertainment centers,
malls, office space etc. BIAL has pioneered the partner selection approach for airside
services through selection of professional international partners. We will offer
competitive price structures and achieve defined quality and service levels for
services such as fuel facility, cargo handling, ground handling, duty free & retail,
food & beverage, flight catering and many other services.
How does BIAL plan to tackle its manpower requirement of 500 people and what are
the employee benefits?
We have been building the BIAL organisation step by step. When we started out in
India, we were just a 6 member team and today we have grown to almost 70 members.
Till now, our focus was to build the leadership team and then move to other levels.
This is a specialized field and we have been successful with the initial phase of
the recruitment. The expansion of air transportation in India is amongst the fastest
in the world and there is a scarcity of experienced personnel in this field. The
challenge is not to find well educated people, but well educated people with loyalty,
strong dedication and most important, experience in airport operation and airport
marketing. Over and above the fascinating work environment and competitive compensation
structure, BIAL offers its employees long term job stability along with all the
other perks that come with a regular job i.e. : employee provident fund, medical
insurance for self and family, accident insurance for self, annual leave encashment,
maternity leave and a sound HR policy. The retirement age at BIAL is 60 years.
In Focus: Business Jets
Till 1986, there were only 50 aircraft, both fixed - wing and helicopters registered
for private and charter use in India. The fixed wing segment were predominantly
dominated by the Beech King Air C-90s and the helicopters were largely the Bell
47G models.
However, business aviation has seen a phenomenal rise since those days and the last
ten years have witnessed an exponential growth. Arguably, the September 11, Al Qaida
bombings may have had their say in how business houses value their staff and how
they plan to circumvent the threat of terrorism. But what has catalyzed the surge
in India is the liberal economic environment and free market forces which has translated
into a booming economy and huge cash reserves both at the corporate and personal
levels. The corporate sector understands that it makes business sense to own its
own aircraft and business aircraft manufacturers are working hard to meet the varied
and rising demands. There is immense competition within the space to grab market
attention and grab a share of the booming market.
India today probably offers the largest potential for executive jet manufacturers
in the Asia Pacific region. This can be gauged from the fact that close to a 100
import permissions have been granted to 70 business firms to buy business jets in
2006 alone. The statistic is mind boggling when compared to figures of past years.
Biz jet manufacturers see India as vital to their global plans and are bracing up
for competition by reinventing themselves and catering to an emerging market. Bombardier
produces business jets that range from the Learjet light aircraft to the ultra long
range Global Express XRS that has a range of 6500nm. It has invested aggressively
in its charter operation business "Skyjet" which offers a jet card system that allows
customers to buy the use of a business jet for as little as 25 hours. The concept
is working fine in markets in the US, Middle East and Europe and Bombardier plans
to offer it across the globe.
Gulfstream is a name synonymous with luxury in the business aviation segment and
offers aircraft in ranges of 2950nm to 6750 nm. Its flagship is the G550 which offers
technology upgrades and allows for safe operations in areas of high terrain and
poor visibility. Cessna has been adding to its product line and recently announced
launches of the Citation CJ4 and the upgraded Citation XLS+. Its Citation Mustang,
which many believe is an entry level business jet at US $2.54million gives good
value for money but it is this very light end of the market where the most excitement
seems to be on offer. However, the entry level market seems to have been shaken
up with the introduction of the ultra light jets Eclipse 500 and the Adam Aircraft
700 on offer at a price of just US $ 1.5 million. The Eclipse 500 is the brainchild
of Vern Raburn of Microsoft who has the backing of Bill Gates in developing this
four seater with a range of 1125nm with many air taxi operators in the US already
queuing up for deliveries.
-
Error Management In Aviation: It Is How We See Than What We See Matters
By: Mr. Subramanian Swaminathan, Jt. GM ATM-OPS AAI, RHQ, NR, New Delhi.
I normally am glued to the idiot box whenever a tennis grand slam event picks up
heat, especially when the tournament reaches the last eighteen stages. For many
years until now, I was never ever perturbed about my lack of knowledge of the nomenclature
in the game, as to why the points start at love all or jump to 15 to 30 to 40 and
not 45. Deuce and advantage and back to deuce has never baffled me. Yes, until recently.
The term forced and unforced error has really gone beyond my eye balls and impinged
me so deeply that I launched myself on the net to fish for the exact details.
Forced errors.. unforced errors ….An unforced Error is when the player has time
to prepare and position himself or herself to get the ball back in play and makes
an error. This is a shot that the player would normally get back into play. The
real keys here are time and position. When the opponent takes away time by hitting
the prior shot with extra pace this can result in a forced error. Also, when the
opponent forces the player out of position with placement (depth and/or angle) this
can result in a forced error.
Slam tennis.. Move over to aviation. A system can induce such forced errors if we
are in pursuit of the wrong objectives. The Goal in this ZIP ZAP ZOOM industry is
clearly one, a capital ONE.. ZAP i.e Zero Accident Policy. However, driving it too
hard may prove disastrous and that is focusing on ZIP or Zero Incident Policy. There
are several illustrations, but the one fresh in our minds is the Mangalore crash
in 2010.
A critical factor that has been reported in the media refers to the Air India Express
diktat, which bars its pilots from hard landing that exceeds 1.65G. To put it in
simpler terms, when a plane’s undercarriage touches down on the airport runway,
its sink rate which is perhaps at 200 feet per minute becomes zero feet per minute
in just a few seconds. A hard landing occurs when the aircraft touches down with
a thud on the runway instead of having a smooth transition while reaching the ground.
Such a hard-smooth landing is termed as “touchdown G” by pilots. The higher the
value of G, the harder the landing of the aircraft would be.
An Air India Express diktat bars pilots from hard landing exceeding 1.65G. When
the undercarriage of a plane touches down on the runway, the sink rate goes from
say 200 feet per minute to zero feet per minute in a few seconds. So for a higher
sink rate, the impact on touchdown is greater and vice versa. A hard landing typically
occurs when the sink rate is high and the aircraft touches down on the runway with
a thud instead of doing a smooth transition onto ground. The hard or smooth quotient
of a landing is expressed in a term called "touchdown G''. A 1G landing means the
force which acted on aircraft tyres at the instant of touchdown is equivalent to
the weight of the aircraft (1 x aircraft weight). A 2G landing would mean the force
is two times the weight of the aircraft. Higher the value of G, harder the landing.
In fact the manufacturer, Airbus specifies a maximum permissible limit of 2.6G.
Another interesting event occurred in 2002, though not an incident per se, worth
taking cognizance of. In Trivandrum en route radar the controller cleared an Air
India flight inbound the 307 Radial for a landing at Trivandrum and maintaining
FL 290, on first radio contact, when the aircraft was yet to come under Radar coverage.
The pilot acknowledged the clearance. An opposite direction Kuwaiti was given climb
to FL 280, requesting FL 310(West bound CVSM level) on a heading that would eventually
ensure lateral separation from the opposite direction AirIndia A310. The Air India
flight was identified a while later once Radar Contact. At 100 NM from Trivandrum
the Kuwaiti was passing FL 260 and asked for a clearance to climb FL 310. The Air
India A310 was at that point in time approximately at a 120 NM and the tracks were
well separated by more than the required minima laterally. However, the controller
asked the Kuwaiti to standby, insteadof issuing a clearance for an uninterrupted
climb to FL 310. At 110 the Kuwaiti reached FL 280 at around the same distance and
time the Air India A310 turned left.The controller queried the Air India about the
turn that he observed, and the reply from the flight crew was that the TVM VOR was
not locking earlier and since the aircraft was flying on IRS, there was a track
difference of more than 3 to 4 degrees between the IRS and the VOR Radial. The reduction
in separation or air miss was avoided only because of divine intervention or a seventh
sense of the controller. Even today we are depending on terrestrial navigational
aids and at the same time making a transition into the celestial navigational aids.
And the simultaneous use or step by step use of the two systems may have some unknown
gaps which can be the source of a few forced errors.
Irrespective of the impressive safety record of ATM many studies from a number of
different safety critical areas - such as aviation, process control and maritime
operations - have shown that a majority of incidents and accidents involve human
error. The current air traffic system is in some respects stretched to its capacity
limits and the challenges to safety of the ATM system may increase in the near future
due to the projected traffic level increases and the introduction of computerised
and automated tools. These changes will have impact on the method of operation in
ATM and may affect the types of errors, the error rates and the chances of recovery.
As a consequence of this it is important to be able to learn from human error events
to ensure that the current high-level of the safety of the system will not be compromised.
Studies have shown that human errors have contributed to about 90% or more of ATM
incidents (Kinney et al., 1977).
By simply stating that almost all incidents are related to human errors does not
advance the understanding of the incident causation and thereby the chances of mitigating
the causal sequence of events. Indeed, if the investigation of critical events in
the area of ATM stops at the conclusion that it was caused by a controller error,
little is achieved except finding a culprit for the adverse consequences. The chances
of learning from the incidents and thereby understanding why they occurred have
been omitted and, just as important, we do not obtain knowledge about how many similar
errors normally are prohibited from having consequences on the system safety. The
quick wind up by indicting the human in the loop leads to two undesirable consequences
on the longer run:
- Once bitten twice shy the human operator tends to be overcautious and compromises
with service delivery, expedition and ultimately system efficiency.
- The objective of mitigation of similar occurrences in the near and long future by
a better study and analysis by the same controller and many other controllers at
the same facility and various facilities is completely obliterated.
To minimise the risk of events that may compromise the safety of the air traffic
it is important to develop error resistance strategies. Error resistance strategies
can be divided into two main categories, namely error prevention and error correction
(Lewis and Norman, 1986; Frese, 1991).The Error Prevention strategies are unforgiving
to errors. An obvious solution to avoid such unwarranted consequences is to make
initiatives to prevent the occurrence of human errors (e.g. through failsafe protection
devices, automation and enhanced procedures).
Safety strategies narrowly based on error prevention, as has been already detailed,
may not be successful for several reasons. First of all, human errors will inevitably
occur and it is impossible to anticipate which errors will occur in a specific task
context. In particular errors that require insight into the higher underlying goals
may be difficult to detect by automated detection devices (Brodbeck et al., 1993)
Second, by focusing exclusively on avoiding various kinds of errors there is a risk
of imposing excessive limitations on the performance which may compromise both effective
and adaptive behaviour. Actually, it has been argued that the efficiency of error
avoidance strategies has been exhausted in ultra-safe areas such as aviation and
air traffic control, and that the end result of increased error suppression may
in fact be counterproductive seen from a safety perspective (Amalberti, 2001). Thirdly,
studies have shown that most errors are actually detected and recovered before leading
to adverse consequences by either the perpetrator or colleagues (Amalberti & Wioland,
1997). Since human errors are inherent to real life and people have powerful capabilities
to control errors it is important to a larger extent to try to manage the manageable
and to support people’s chances of detecting and recovering from errors. Consequently,
error management should be considered an important supplementary safety goal.
In spite of a growing interest in the field of error management the understanding
of how errors are detected and recovered has failed to keep pace with the understanding
of the mechanisms underlying human error. A possible explanation of the scarcity
of studies of the error handling process in safety science may be found in the fact
that error reduction has for a long time been considered the primary and most important
means to achieve high reliability and safety. In other words: the "zero accident
policy", which remains the ultimate safety goal, has been interpreted as the "zero
error policy" (Wioland & Amalberti, 1996). The zero-error policy is not only problematic
because it ignores the fact that there is a random aspect about human errors and
some types of errors may be difficult to avoid (e.g. cognitive tunnel vision and
confirmation bias). The problem is also that the zero-error policy underestimates
or ignores the potentially positive value of errors (Senders & Moray, 1991; Frese
& Van Dyck, 1996):
The result of an over-emphasis on error avoidance will be a reduced ability to cope
and control error-induced problems.. On the other hand, the more errors we make
the better we get at dealing with them. Since errors can be upsetting and frustrating,
experience with error situations can be important in relation to learning to deal
effectively and rationality with such situations. That is, by having experienced
similar error situations before the person will know how to correct the error quickly
and, as a consequence, also be less upset when such situations arise.
Error avoidance strategies will put limits on the range of behaviour that is possible
and thereby reduce the chances of applying creative solutions to novel and unexpected
problems. Such solutions might be important in relation to finding better ways of
doing things. Experience with error situations may be beneficial in the development
of an understanding of the dynamics of a system. Errors constitute an important
feedback concerning what the person does not know yet and can therefore be used
as a means to remove previous misconceptions. A couple of years ago there was strange
medical case where a female child had no pain conveyed o her brain. The first thought
that crossed my mind was that this child was a really blessed one that she did not
have to go through what the rest of the humanity and for that matter the extended
animal kingdom had to go through. However, I was startled to know a top team of
medicos were working overnight to put the” pain” back into her system. Without pain
the child would never ever know even if she were to have a deep cut in her wrist
and is bleeding profusely which can be life endangering. Pain is the only way we
come to know of a physical system failure. The feedback system is vital. Errors
in Aviation are akin to pain in the human beings. You hate to have it, but it is
worse than you can ever imagine not having it. Therefore you better have it than
not.
The increased scientific and practical interest in the field of error management
has created an impetus for a new attitude towards human errors and towards the role
of human operators in the control of complex systems. The traditional view of the
human operator within the area of human reliability research has been that human
operators are "intelligent but fragile" machines and, as a consequence, the role
of the human actor should be minimised (e.g. through automation). A more positive
attitude towards the human operator has gradually emerged as a result of recent
research findings. These results have, among other things, revealed that human operators
develop protections and defences against their own cognitive deficiencies (Amalberti
& Wioland, 1997). In this manner the human operator plays a positive role in returning
a system to a normal and safe state after the occurrence of an error. This positive
role is, of course, not limited to the recovery of human errors, but also to technical
failures. Imagine, situations such as Radar system failures, where the controllers
restore normalcy in no time by safely transitioning into the procedural(non radar)
control of the air traffic or a pilot landing safely into the Hudson after a major
system failure of the on board avionics.
If error management should be considered an important safety strategy it should
be possible to build safety barriers into man-machine systems based on error management.
Actually, research has shown that recovery is more than sheer luck and coincidence
(Van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2000). The results indicate that recovery is something
that can be planned for and that the human operator can play a powerful role in
relation to preventing small failures and errors from developing into actual system
breakdowns. More specifically, several researchers have demonstrated how different
human factors initiatives - such as training, design and organisational culture
- can support the human recovery process.
The focus should be on designing excellent DSS(Decision Support Systems) and DST(decision
Support Tools) which focus on mitigating the consequences of human error. Rasmussen
(1984) has proposed that error recovery is critically dependent on the observability
and reversibility of errors and their effects. Training is another important KRA
(Key Result Area). It has been suggested that coping with errors may be an important
part of acquiring skills and expertise in a specific domain (Seifert & Hutchins,
1994). Therefore, errors should not necessarily be viewed as something that should
be avoided at any prize, but instead as an opportunity to develop professional problem
solving abilities and the system should support coping with them to ensure low system
output error. In fact, the most proficient problem solvers may not necessarily be
those who commit fewer errors, but those who have the greatest abilities to recover
from their errors (Allwood, 1984). Reinforcing the error handling capabilities may
be achieved through training concepts such as error management training. In this
training technique trainees are encouraged to have a positive attitude towards errors
(e.g. by simple heuristics such as “I have made an error. Great!”) and forced to
make errors (e.g. by giving them problems that exceed their level of expertise)
(Dormann & Frese, 1994). Several human computer-interaction studies (Dormann & Frese,
1994; Nordstrom et al., 1998) have demonstrated a higher after-training performance
for trainees being exposed to the error management training compared with trainees
being exposed to error avoidance training. Organisational culture is another important
factor. Organisations may vary in relation to their error culture. At one extreme
an organisation might aim at avoiding errors at all in so far as errors may be associated
with grave consequences. This approach can have some negative side effects. If,
for example, an organisation has a strong error prevention philosophy it will normally
imply that errors are severely sanctioned which means that people will be unwilling
to report errors. The result may be that the organisation misses a vital source
of information in relation to learning from errors. Furthermore, a defensive attitude
might be the result and many resources will be spent on covering up errors instead
of benefiting from their potential learning value. On the other extreme, organisations
associated with a high-level of error tolerance – entailing factors such as openness
to errors, analysis of the errors committed and long-term learning - may instead
benefit from errors. Such an approach may ultimately play a significant role for
the success of an organization. Empirical data supports the notion that organisations
characterised by an error tolerant culture have a higher tendency to also be associated
with the highest level of performance, as measured by both subjective and objective
performance scales (Van Dyck et al., 1999). As also supported by the above-described
studies of error management training this could indicate that the way people perceive
errors and handle them influences performance. It can also indicate that these organisations
become better at implementing defences and barriers to avoid the negative consequences.
This culture is at the very root of the JUST CULTURE concept. Though well meant
and adequately elaborately stated, vast improvement is desired from the point of
view of understanding of this culture from the incident investigators, ANSPs, regulators,
enforcers, legal eagles and even the general public.
There have been some discussions about whether it is correct to speak of "errors"
at all. It has been argued that the attribution of cause to the human (and not some
system) components is to some extent dependent on the stop rule applied in the after-the-fact
analysis of the causal chain and is therefore not dependent on any objective standards
(Rasmussen, 1983). When analysing the causes of substandard system performance the
search back through the causal chain will typically continue until a familiar and
reasonable explanation has been found and a cure is available. Since the human component
plays a salient role in the man-machine systems there is a large chance that the
search for the causal explanation will stop when having found a "human error". The
attribution of the cause to human error is also convenient because a well-known
cure is available (such as "blame and train"). The label “human error” also implies
"man-machine misfits" (Rasmussen, 1983) or "erroneous actions" (Hollnagel, 1990).
An attribution of adverse events to the human component of the man-machine system
is also problematic because it from a legalistic perspective implies a neglected
and thereby punishable act. In this manner the human controller becomes the scapegoat
and is blamed for some undesirable consequences. This is unfortunate because the
actions performed by the controller are selected on the basis of what is thought
to be the most appropriate action in the given situation. Nonetheless, bad outcomes
(i.e. incidents and accidents) will often be attributed to process defects (for
example, a bad decision) in spite of the fact that there is a loose coupling between
process and outcome. That is, good decisions may in some situations be followed
by bad outcomes, but in other situations be inconsequential. Nonetheless, hindsight
bias - i.e. the tendency to judge the quality of the process on the basis of the
product and to over-estimate what could have been known in advance - can have strong
implications for error analyses.
Finally, to label some process defect as “human error” implies that there exists
a criterion or standard that the performance can be compared with and that the performance
does not satisfy this criterion. The most obvious criterion to apply is the standard
operating procedures. However, the standard operating procedures do not necessarily
constitute an unambiguous criterion. First, not all situations can be covered by
the standard operating procedures. Second, people rarely recognise rule violations
made by themselves as errors, because the violations may be motivated by efficiency
and/or safety concerns (for example, an ATCO may not provide a pilot with traffic
information after resolving the conflict due to other pending tasks in spite of
this being required according to the procedures). Actually, violations and modification
of formal rules might be quite rational given the actual workload and time constraints.
Furthermore, such violations might be an integrated part of the established practice
(Rasmussen, 1997). In addition, as pointed out by Reason (1997) the proliferation
of well intended procedures may serve to reduce compliance with procedures and may
thereby be an invitation to violations. An alternative criterion could be violation
of good working practice. That is, would other professionals with similar background
have acted likewise given the constraints of the situation or was the performance
below a generally accepted standard. This criterion may be of particular relevance
in an area such as air traffic control insofar as it is a domain that is, in comparison
with e.g. aviation, less dominated by procedures. However, this criterion is also
problematic because different people may have different conceptions (dependent on
e.g. background and culture) of what constitutes good working practice and, again,
hindsight bias may obscure the validity of such judgements. Interestingly A NavCanada
(ANSP) incident investigation of a Mooney aircraft which crossed the flight path
of another fixed wing aircraft reports that Controllers violate some of the Standard
Operating Procedures in order to expedite traffic, which their management is well
aware of, and therefore cannot be solely held responsible for the breach of separation.
Detailed studies on error management including development of taxonomies have been
undertaken by scholars in their doctoral and post doctoral research studies. Thomas
Bove (Riso National Laboratory & University of Roskilde) has contributed immensely
and his doctoral thesis “A Human Error Management Taxonomy in Air Traffic Control”,
an eye opener on the subject, should be mandatorily studied by all stake holders
before they sit upon judgments.
I shall do justice by quoting the hero of the H.G. Wells saga “Around the world
in eighty days”, which is a fiction written before the first successful flight,
“do not jump on conclusions or else conclusions will jump on you.”
-
Suppression of the financing of terrorism
By: Ruwantissa Abeyratne
Suppressing the financing of terrorism is a major measure against terrorism. However
it is just one of the many tools in a conglomeration of connected measures that
goes toward combating terrorism. Therefore, any study of the financing of terrorism
and the fight against it would not be complete with an analysis of the collective
counter-terrorism measures to be used in combating the problem. This article discusses
the subject of suppressing the financing of terrorism against the backdrop of the
offence of terrorism and its related issues.
Abstract : Regrettably, terrorism and transport are linked. Attacks or attempted
attacks against society have been carried out frequently through air transport,
the most recent at the time of writing being attempts to blow up air cargo facilities
in the aircraft. A significant advantage enjoyed by conventional terrorism is the
ready funding available from various spurious sources toward the commission of terrorist
acts. Therefore, thereis a compelling need for the international community to eradicate
the financing of terrorism or at least to curb it. In General Assembly Resolution
51/210 of 17 December 1996, the Assembly called upon all States to take steps to
prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of
terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct or indirect
through organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural
goals or which are also engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking,
drug dealing and racketeering, including the exploitation of persons for purposes
of funding terrorist activities, and in particular to consider, where appropriate,
adopting regulatory measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected
to be intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in any way the freedom of
legitimate capital movements and to intensify the exchange of information concerning
international movements of such funds. The United Nations General Assembly, on 9
December 1999, adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, aimed at enhancing international co-operation among States in devising
and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism,
as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators.
This article identifies modes of terrorism that are effectively funded and which
could affect the safety of transportation. It also discusses State responsibility
and the political will of States to respond to this issue.
Introduction : Suppressing the financing of terrorism is a major measure
against terrorism. However it is just one of the many tools in a conglomeration
of connected measures that goes toward combating terrorism. Therefore, any study
of the financing of terrorism and the fight against it would not be complete with
an analysis of the collective counter-terrorism measures to be used in combating
the problem. This article discusses the subject of suppressing the financing of
terrorism against the backdrop of the offence of terrorism and its related issues.
The United Nations General Assembly, on 9 December 1999, adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,' aimed at enhancing
international co-operation among States in devising and adopting effective measures
for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression
through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators.
The Convention, in its Article 2 recognizes that any person who by any means directly
or indirectly, unlawfully or wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention
that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or
in part, in order to carry out any act which constitutes an offence under certain
named treaties, commits an offence. The treaties listed are those that are already
adopted and in force and which address acts of unlawful interference with such activities
as deal with air transport and maritime transport. Also cited is the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on 15 December 1997.
Suppression of the financing of terrorism : The Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism also provides that, over and above the acts mentioned,
providing or collecting funds toward any other act intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in
the hostilities in the situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act,
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, would be
deemed an offence under the Convention.
The use of the word "terrorism" in the title of the Convention brings to bear the
need to examine in greater detail both the etymology and the connotations of the
word in modern parlance. The term "terrorism" is seemingly of French origin and
is believed to have been first used in 1798. "Terrorism", which originally had connotations
of criminality to one's conduct, is now generally considered a system of coercive
intimidation brought about by the infliction of terror or fear. The most frustrating
obstacle to the control of unlawful acts against international peace is the paucity
of clear definition of the offence itself. Many attempts at defining the offence
have often resulted in the offence being shrouded in political or national barriers.
In 1980 the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America adopted
a definition of terrorism which read: Terrorism is the threat or use of violence
for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition
to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock,
stun or intimidate victims. Terrorism, has involved groups seeking to overthrow
specific regimes, to rectify perceived national or group grievances, or to undermine
international order as an end in itself.
This all embracing definition underscores the misapprehension that certain groups
which are etched in history such as the French Resistance of Nazi occupied France
during World War 11 and the Contras in Nicaragua would broadly fall within the definitive
parameters of terrorism. In fact, this formula labels every act of violence as being
"terrorist" engulfing in its broad spectrum such diverse groups as the Seikigunhaof
Japan and the Mujahedeen of Afghanistan, although their aims, modus operandi and
ideologies are different. James Adams prefers a narrower definition which reads:
a terrorist is an individual or member of a group that wishes to achieve political
ends using violent means, often at the cost of casualties to innocent civilians
and with the support of only a minority of the people they claim to represent.
The CIA website states: The Intelligence Community is guided by the definition of
terrorism contained in Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d):
- The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.
- The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving the territory or the
citizens of more than one country.
- The term "terrorist group" means any group that practices, or has significant subgroups
that practice, International terrorism. See https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war
on-terorism/terrorism-faqs.html.
Even this definition although narrower than the 1980 definition cited above is not
sufficiently comprehensive to cover for instance the terrorist who hijacks an air
plane for his own personal gain. The difficulty in defining the term seems to lie
in its association with political aims of the terrorist as is found in the definition
that terrorism is really: terror inspired by violence, containing an international
element that is committed by individuals or groups against non-combatants, civilians,
States or internationally protected persons or entities in order to achieve political
ends.
The offence of terrorism has also been defined as one caused by: ...any serious
act of violence or threat thereof by an individual. Whether acting alone or in association
with other persons which is directed against internationally protected persons,
organizations, places, transportation or communication systems or against members
of the general public for the purpose of intimidating such persons, causing injury
to or the death of such persons, disrupting the activities of such international
organizations, of causing loss, detriment or damage to such places or property,
or of interfering with such transportation and communications systems in order to
undermine friendly relations among States or among the nationals of different States
or to extort concessions from States.8 It is time that terrorism is recognised as
an offence that is sui generis and one that is not always international in nature
and motivated by the political aims of the perpetrator.
For the moment, if terrorism were to be regarded as the use of fear, subjugation
and intimidation to disrupt the normal operations of humanity, a more specific and
accurate definition could be sought, once more analysis is carried out on the subject.
One must always be mindful however, that without a proper and universally acceptable
definition, international cooperation in combating terrorism would be impossible.
A terrorist act is one which is mala in se or evil by nature and has been associated
with the political repression of the French Revolution era where, it is said, the
word terrorism was coined. A terrorist is a hostishumani generis or common enemy
of humanity.
International terrorism has so far not been defined comprehensively largely due
to the fact that owing to its diversity of nature the concept itself has defied
precise definition. However, this does not preclude the conclusion that international
terrorism involves two factors. They are:
- The commission of a terrorist act by a terrorist or terrorists : and
- The "international" element involved in the act or acts in question i.e., that the
motivation for the commission of such act or acts or the eventual goal of the terrorist
should inextricably be linked with a country other than that in which the act or
acts are committed.
Perhaps the oldest paradigm of international terrorism is piracy which has been
recognized as an offense against the law of nations and which is seen commonly today
in the offense of aerial piracy or hijacking.
Acts of international terrorism that have been committed over the past two decades
are too numerous to mention. Suffice it to say, that the most deleterious effect
of the offense is that it exacerbates international relations and endangers international
security. From the isolated incidents of the sixties, international terrorism has
progressed to becoming a concentrated assault on nations and organizations that
are usually susceptible to political conflict, although politics is not always the
motivation of the international terrorist. International terrorism has been recognized
to engulf acts of aggression by one State on another as well as by an individual
or a group of individuals of one State on another State. The former.typifies such
acts as invasion, while the latter relates to such individual acts of violence as
hijacking and the murder of civilians in isolated instances. In both instances,
the duties of the offender-State have been emphatically recognized. Such duties
are to condemn such acts and take necessary action.
The United Nations has given effect to this principle in 1970 when it proclaimed
that: Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization
of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the
territory of another State. Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts
in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force.9
The most pragmatic approach to the problem lies in identifying the parameters of
the offense of international terrorism and seeking a solution to the various categories
of the offense. To obtain a precise definition would be unwise, if not impossible.
Once the offense and its parasitic qualities are clearly identified, it would become
necessary to discuss briefly its harmful effects on the international community.
It is only then that a solution can be discussed that would obviate the fear and
apprehension we suffer in the face of this threat.
Acts of international terrorism
It is said that terrorism is a selective use of fear, subjugation and intimidation
to disrupt the normal operations of society. Beyond this statement which stands
both for national and international terrorism any attempt at a working definition
of the words "international terrorism" would entail complications. However, in seeking
a solution which would lead to the control of international terrorism it is imperative
that contemporaneous instances of the infliction of terror be identified in order
that they may be classified either as acts of international terrorism or as mere
innocuous acts of self defence. Broadly acts of international terrorism may be categorized
into two distinct groups. In the first category may be included what are termed
as acts of oppression such as the invasion of one state by another. In the second
category are acts which are deviously claimed to be acts of defence. While the former
is self explanatory, the latter-by far the more prolific in modern society-can be
identified in four separate forms of manifestation. They are:
- Acts claimed to be committed in self defence and in pursuance of self-determination
to circumvent oppression;
- Nonviolent acts committed internationally which are calculated to sabotage and destroy
an established regime;
- Random acts of violence committed internationally by an individual or groups of
individuals to pressurize a State or a group of individuals to succumb to the demands
of terrorists; and,
- Acts committed internationally which aid and abet national terrorism.
With the exception of the first category of invasion, the others are prima facie
acts of international terrorism which are essentially extensions of national terrorism.
That is to say that most acts of international terrorism are a species of the genus
national terrorism.
Acts of defence : Some States claim that internal oppression either by foreign
invasion or by an internal totalitarian regime necessitates guerrilla warfare for
the achievement of freedom. With more, emphasis, it has been claimed that one state
must not be allowed to exploit and harass another and that the physical manifestation
of desire to attain freedom should not be construed as terrorism. Often, such acts
of self defence prove to take extreme violent forms and manifest themselves overseas,
thus giving rise to international terrorism. Acts of defence, as they are called,
are common forms of international terrorism and are categorized as political violence.
These acts take the form of acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose,
choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and/or effects
have political significance.
Organized political groups plan strikes and acts of violence internally while extensions
of these groups carry out brutal assassinations, kidnapping and cause severe damage
to property overseas. The retaliatory process which commences as a token of self
defence transcends itself to terroristic violence which is totally ruthless and
devoid of moral scruples. Usually, a cause which originates as dedicated to self
defence and self determination aligns itself to gaining the support of the people,
disarming the military strength of the regime against which it rebels and above
all seeks to strengthen itself in order that the terrorist movement attains stability.
In this instance terrorist acts seek primarily to carry out a massive propaganda
campaign in the international community while at the same time concentrating more
on individual instances of terrorism in populated urban areas which attract attention
more than those committed in isolated areas. Advertising a cause in the international
community becomes an integral part of political terrorism of this nature.
Both the international community and the governments concerned should be mindful
that acts of defence can be treated as such only in instances where people defend
themselves when they are attacked and not when retaliatory measures are taken in
isolation to instil fear in the international community. To that extent, acts of
defence can be differentiated from acts of terrorism.
Nonviolent acts : There are instances where terrorism extends to destabilizing
an established regime or a group of persons by the use of threats which are often
calculated to instil fear in the international community. Typical examples of this
kind of terrorism are the spreading of false propaganda and the invocation of threats
which unhinge both the nation or a group of persons against whom the threats are
carried out and the nations in which such acts are said to be committed. There have
been instances in the past where export consumer commodities of a nation such as
food items have been claimed to be poisoned in order that foreign trade between
nations be precluded. Although such acts are devoid of actual physical violence,
they tend to unhinge the economic stability of a nation particularly if such nation
depends solely on the export of the item in question. In such instances, international
terrorism assumes proportions of great complexity and succeeds at least temporarily
to disrupt the infrastructural equilibrium of the nation against which such threat
is aimed. The government concerned is immediately placed on the defensive and attempts
counter-propaganda. In spreading propaganda of this nature, the media is the terrorist's
best friend. He uses the media of television and radio as a symbolic weapon to instil
fear in the public and to cripple the persons or government against which his attack
has been aimed. The effect of publicity on people is truly tangible, whether it
pertains to the statement of facts or whether it relates to the issuance of threats.
Primarily, media terrorism creates an emotional state of apprehension and fear in
threatened groups and secondly, draws world attention to the existence of the terrorists
and their cause. In both instances, the terrorist succeeds in creating a credibility
gap between his target and the rest of the world. Psychological terrorism of this
nature is perhaps the most insidious of its kind. It is certainly the most devious.
Random acts of violence : A random act of violence is normally a corollary
to a threat though not necessarily so. Often as it happens, the international community
is shocked by a despicable act of mass murder and destruction of property which
takes the world completely by surprise. Responsibility for the act is acknowledged
later though in many instances no responsibility is claimed. In the latter instance
when no responsibility is claimed, the offended nation and the world at large are
rendered destitute of an immediate remedy against the offense. Even if motive is
imputed to a particular terrorist group, the exercise of sanction becomes difficult
as the international community would not condone sanction in the absence of concrete
and cogent evidence.
The difficulty lies largely on the fact that any terrorist act is usually carefully
planned and executed. Often one observes that the terrorist cautiously retracts
his steps obscuring all evidence unless he seeks publicity. The average terrorist
is a militant who employs tactics aimed at instilling fear in the minds of the international
community. His acts are calculated to instil fright and paralyse the infrastructure
of a state by totally exhausting the strength of his target. He further disarms
his target by introducing the element of surprise to his attack. Perhaps the most
outstanding element of a random attack is the psychological element where excessive
and sporadic acts of violence instil both fear and psychological disorientation
in a society. This in turn contributes to undermining and weakening a government's
authority and control. The disruptive influence that terrorism of this kind exercises
over society often creates disharmony within the, political circles of a nation
and unhinges the psychological behavioural pattern of an organized society. Most
often the gap between the citizen and the established government both in the State
in which the act is committed and in the state against which the act is committed
is widened as the average citizen tends to regard his personal security as the most
inviolate of rights that has to be protected by his government.
Acts which aid and abet national terrorism : The fourth facet of international
terrorism pertains to acts which promote national terrorism and which are committed
outside the State against which the terrorist cause exists. These acts manifest
themselves in the maintenance of overseas training camps for terrorists where guerilla
warfare, techniques of assassination, destruction and sabotage are taught to terrorist
groups who, after sustained training, return to their country and practice what
they learn overseas. Such training camps are conducted usually by revolutionary
groups and mercenaries on the request of terrorist organizations. A natural corollary
to this trend is the collection of funds overseas for the financing of such training
programmes, the purchase of arms, ammunition and explosives and the collection of
monies involved in meeting the costs incurred by foreign propaganda.
Indirect acts of international terrorism such as those which aid and abet national
terrorism indicate clearly that although there is no identifiable definition of
the word "terrorism", the word itself can no longer be associated only with violent
acts of aggression. In fact, recent studies reflect that any organized campaign
of international terrorism involves both direct and indirect acts in equal proportion.
Broadly, international terrorism embitters humanity and antagonizes one nation against
another, one human being against another. The eventual consequence of the problem
is aggression and even war. The main aim of use of the psychological element by
the international terrorist which is by far the most obnoxious and objectionable
ambition is to polarize humans and society. However, its immediate manifestation
and future development are not without features sufficient to cause grave concern
to the world.
Acts of international terrorism, whether in the form of violent or non violent acts
have clear and immediate international consequences. They are numerous in nature
and warrant a separate study. However, in effect they obtain for the miscreant the
same result of creating disharmony and disruption in society. The concept has grown
in recent times to portend more serious problems to the international community.
Those problems are worthy of comment.
Terrorism has so far not reached the proportions of being an international conspiracy
although one group identifies its objectives and purpose with another. We have not
had the misfortune of seeing all terrorist groups band together to work as a composite
element. This has not happened for the reason that diverse ideologies and religions
have kept each group separate. Nevertheless, there is a strong identity bond between
groups and even evidence that one helps the other with training and military aid,
even though their causes are quite different. The link between terrorist groups
is an important consideration for the world as close association between groups
could strengthen a weak force and nurture it to maturity. In addition, strong and
established terrorist organizations, under cover of burgeoning groups, could carry
out campaigns which would cover their tracks and make identification difficult.
In most instances, this was found to be true and investigation reveals that a small
group, not too significant at that time to take account of, has been responsible
for an act or acts whereas later it is revealed that a much stronger group had masterminded
the offenses for its benefit. Another important feature of the growing incidence
of international terrorism is the assistance the terrorists receive from the advancement
of technology in communication, the manufacture.of sophisticated weaponry and the
proliferation of nuclear armament. In today's context, terrorism has blown to unmanageable
proportions with the use of advanced weapons of destruction. Arms control plays
a vital role in the control of aggression and it naturally follows that terrorism
too benefits from the availability of new modes of aggression. The vulnerability
of the international community has been mainly brought upon by the paucity of adequate
security measures to prevent nuclear theft. With the growth of the nuclear power
industry, developed nations exposed themselves to the vulnerability of theft by
power groups, in whose hands nuclear weapons act as threats of destruction. The
most effective counter measure that can be taken in this instance against the threat
of nuclear theft is to take such effective measures as are necessary to protect
the stored items and to make known to the terrorist the high risk involved in an
attempt to steal such material. Ideally, any hope of theft must be obviated. This
can be achieved by strengthening governmental security.
Problems of deterrence : The only deterrence that would be effective against
terrorism of any nature is broadly based on the success of convincing the terrorist
that the risk he takes outweighs the benefits which may accrue to his cause by his
act. The futility of attempting to wipe out terrorism by the use of military force
or the threat of General sanction on an international level is apparent. The terrorist
has to be shown that any attempt at terrorist activity would cause him and his cause
more harm than good. Deterrence in this context attains fruition when effective
thepunitive sanctions are prescribed and carried out while simultaneously denying
the terrorist his demands. In both instances the measures taken should be imperatively
the terrorist his demands. In both instances the measures taken should be imperatively
effective. It is not sufficient if such measures are merely entered into the statute
booksOf a state or incorporated into international treaty. The international community
has has to be convinced that such measures are forceful and capable of being carried
out.
However, deterrence does not stop at the more imposition of effective sanction nor
does it complete its task by the denial of terrorist demands. Perhaps the most effective
method of countering terrorism is psychological warfare .The terrorist himself depends
heavily on psychology. His main task is to polarize the people and the establishment.
He wants popular support and a sympathetic ear. He wants a lot of people listening
and watching, not a lot of people dead. Counter measures taken against a terrorist
attack, be it hostage taking. Kidnapping or a threat of murder should essentially
include an effective campaign to destroy the terrorist’s credibility and sincerity
in the eyes of the public. Always, the loyalty of the public should be won over
by the target and not by terrorist. It is only then that the terrorist’s risk outweighs
the benefits be obtains. To achieve this objective it must be ensured that the terrorist
receives publicity detrimental to him, showing the public that if the threatened
person, group of persons or state comes to harm, the terrorist alone is responsible.
Thereforethe most practical measures that could be adopted to deter the spread of
terrorism can be accommodated in two chronological stages;
- Measures taken before the commission of offense as the effective imposition and
carrying out of sanctions and the refusal to readily comply with the demand of the
terrorist;
- Measures taken after the commission of the act such as the skilful use of the media
to destroy the credibility of the terrorist cause and to convince the people that
the responsibility for the developers at all stages solely upon the terrorist one
difficulty in exercising deterrence against terrorism in general and international
terrorist in particular is that often, the measures taken are not effective enough
to convinceThe terrorist that in the end, more harm would be caused to him than
good . Negotiation with the terrorist in particular has to done by professionals
specially trained for the task.
A fortiori, the media has to be handled by specialists with experience. Things would
be much more difficult for the terrorist if these were done. The greatest problem
of deterrence is the deterrence is the pusillanimity of the international community
in the face of terrorism and the feeble response offered by states as a composite
body. The reasons for this hesitation on the part of international community to
adopt effective measures against international terrorism are by no means inexplicable.
When one state supports a revolutionary cause which is aimed against another, it
is quite natural that the terrorist is aware of the supporthe is capable of obtaining
from at least one part of the already polarized world. Therein lies the problem
objectionable ambition is to polarize humans and society. However, its immediate
manifestation and future development are not without features sufficient to cause
grave concern to the world.
Acts of international terrorism, whether in the form of violent or non violent acts
have clear and immediate international consequences. They are numerous in nature
and warrant a separate study. However, in effect they obtain for the miscreant the
same result of creating disharmony and disruption in society. The concept has grown
in recent times to portend more serious problems to the international community.
Those problems are worthy of comment.
Terrorism has so far not reached the proportions of being an international conspiracy
although one group identifies its objectives and purpose with another. We have not
had the misfortune of seeing all terrorist groups band together to work as a composite
element. This has not happened for the reason that diverse ideologies and religions
have kept each group separate. Nevertheless, there is a strong identity bond between
groups and even evidence that one helps the other with training and military aid,
even though their causes are quite different. The link between terrorist groups
is an important consideration for the world as close association between groups
could strengthen a weak force and nurture it to maturity. In addition, strong and
established terrorist organizations, under cover of burgeoning groups, could carry
out campaigns which would cover their tracks and make identification difficult.
In most instances, this was found to be true and investigation reveals that a small
group, not too significant at that time to take account of, has been responsible
for an act or acts whereas later it is revealed that a much stronger group had masterminded
the offenses for its benefit. Another important feature of the growing incidence
of international terrorism is the assistance the terrorists receive from the advancement
of technology in communication, the manufacture of sophisticated weaponry and the
proliferation of nuclear armament. In today's context, terrorism has blown to unmanageable
proportions with the use of advanced weapons of destruction. Arms control plays
a vital role in the control of aggression and it naturally follows that terrorism
too benefits from the availability of new modes of aggression. The vulnerability
of the international community has been mainly brought upon by the paucity of adequate
security measures to prevent nuclear theft. With the growth of the nuclear power
industry, developed nations exposed themselves to the vulnerability of theft by
power groups, in whose hands nuclear weapons act as threats of destruction. The
most effective counter measure that can be taken in this instance against the threat
of nuclear theft is to take such effective measures as are necessary to protect
the stored items and to make known to the terrorist the high risk involved in an
attempt to steal such material. Ideally, any hope of theft must be obviated. This
can be achieved by strengthening governmental security.
The practical solution : The primary objective of international peace and
security is the endeavour to preserve the right to life and liberty. This right
is entrenched in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
and is accepted today as constituting an obligation on all member States to recognize
the legally and morally binding nature of the Declaration. Therefore the destruction
of human life and the restriction of liberty are acts committed against international
law and order. International terrorism destroys both life and liberty. Indeed there
need be no doubt in our minds that international terrorism is illegal. To begin
with, there should be more awareness in the world today that every human being has
the inherent right to life and that the right is protected by law. Any act of terrorism
being illegal, becomes subject to law and its punitive sanctions. However, in this
instance, unlike in a simple instance of murder where sanction itself may act as
a deterrent, the two forces of law and sanction are not sufficient to curb terrorism.
The international community should realize that the solution to terrorism lies rather
in its prevention than in its cure. Therefore the problem has to be approached solely
on the basis that the terrorist on the one hand has to be dissuaded that his act
may not succeed while on the other he has to be persuaded that even if he succeeded
in committing the act of terrorism, it would not achieve for him the desired results.
The philosophy of warfare against terrorism is therefore based on one single fact-that
of convincing the terrorist that any attempt at committing a terrorist act would
be fruitless and would entail for him unnecessary harm. This simple philosophy should
be adopted gradually in stages with the sustained realization that each measure
taken is as important as the next and that all measures should be adopted as a composite
element and not as those that are mutually exclusive.
A potential terrorist can therefore be attacked in two ways:
- By the adoption of practical measures to discourage the commission of the act;
- By the adoption of such effective measures as would impose severe punitive sanctions
if the act is committed.
In the first instance measures of self help are imperative. They should be adopted
with careful planning and the terrorist should be made aware that the communities
at large are afforded the full protection of these measures. They are:
- The establishment of a system of intelligence which would inform the state concerned
of an impending terrorist attack;
- The establishment of counter-terrorism mechanisms which would effectively preclude
such catalysts as the collection of arms, ammunition and weaponry;
- The adoption of such practical measures of self-help and attack as are necessary
in an instance of an attack;
- The existence of the necessary machinery to retain the confidence and sympathy of
the public at all times;
- The persuasion necessary to convince the public that terrorism of any kind is evil
and should not be condoned, whatever its cause is.
The second instance is concerned with measures taken in the event a terrorist act
is committed. If strongly enforced with unanimity, such measures as the imposition
of laws which bind all nations to view terrorist acts as crimes against humanity
can be an effective deterrent. A fortiori, sanctions would further discourage the
terrorist.
Money laundering
In theory, the financing of terrorism and money laundering are antithetical in that
while the former involves the support of terrorism through the injection of funds
the latter involves covering money acquired through acts of criminality in a cloak
of legitimacy. In other words money laundering is "the process by which the source
and ownership of criminally derived wealth and property is changed to confer on
it a perception of legitimacy".10 From the point of view of the criminal, there
seem to be three basic requirements: a) the need to conceal the true ownership and
origin of the proceeds; b) the need to maintain control of the proceeds; and c)
the need to change the form of the proceeds.11 However, it is incontrovertible that
there is a certain synergy between the two, as one feeds off the other and often
the money gained from acts of terrorism are laundered and put back into funding
acts of terrorism The enormity and wide-spread nature of money laundering on a global
scale is reflected by the fact that the International Monetary Fund has estimated
that, during the decade 1999-2009 the aggregate size of money-laundering was anywhere
between 2% and 5% of the world's gross domestic product. Just as an example, it
is reported that in 2007, the money generated by organized crime in the United Kingdom
was 15 billion Pounds Sterling, of which 10 billion was laundered.
The most fundamental measure taken against money laundering is to criminalize it
and to adopt legislative and other measures to identify, trace, freeze, seize and
confiscate the proceeds of crime. To this the international effort is quite significant,
particular concerning concerted action taken by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), which is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and
promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing. The FATF is therefore a 'policy-making body' created in 1989
that works to generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and
regulatory reforms in these areas.14 The FATF has recommended that: the 1999 United
Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and relevant
UN Security Council Resolutions be ratified and implemented; the financing of terrorism,
terrorist acts and terrorist organisations be criminalized; terrorist assets be
frozen and confiscated; the widest possible assistance be extended to other countries'
law enforcement and regulatory authorities for terrorist financing investigations;
suspicious transactions related to terrorism be reported; anti-money laundering
requirements on alternative remittance systems be imposed; ensure that entities,
in particular non-profit organisations, cannot be misused to finance terrorism;
and customer identification measures in international and domestic wire transfers
be strengthened.
The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/198.htm),
signed at Warsaw in December 2005 provides, in Article 2 that each Party shall adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate
instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such
proceeds and laundered property. The Convention goes on to say that Parties may
provide for mandatory confiscation in respect of offences which are subject to the
confiscation regime which may include money laundering, drug trafficking, trafficking
in human beings and any other serious offence.15 Furthermore it is stated in the
Convention that each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may
be necessary to require that, in respect of a serious offence or offences as defined
by national law, an offender demonstrates the origin of alleged proceeds or other
property liable to confiscation to the extent that such a requirement is consistent
with the principles of its domestic law.16 There is also provision for each Party
to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to
identify, trace, freeze or seize rapidly property which is liable to confiscation,
in order in particular to facilitate the enforcement of a later confiscation.17
A significant provision of the Convention lies in Article 5 which states that each
Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure
that the measures to freeze, seize and confiscate also encompass: the property into
which the proceeds have been transformed or converted; property acquired from legitimate
sources, if proceeds have been intermingled, in whole or in part, with such property,
up to the assessed.
Value of the intermingled proceeds; and income or other benefits derived from proceeds,
from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or
from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled, up to the assessed
value of the intermingled proceeds, in the same manner and to the same extent as
proceeds.
Conclusion : Cutting off funding and enforcing rigid legislation against
the financing of terrorism and implementing such is indeed an effective international
measure against terrorism. While some countries have taken effective measures in
this regard others are developing legislation.18 However, for any measure against
terrorism, the fundamental and compelling factor is the need to infuse a security
culture among nations. A security culture, if such were to exist among States, would
mean that the States would be aware of their rights and duties, and, more importantly,
assert them. Those who belong to a security culture also know which conduct would
compromises security and they are quick to educate and caution those who, out of
ignorance, forgetfulness, or personal weakness, partake in insecure conduct. This
security consciousness becomes a "culture" when all the States of the world as a
whole make security violations socially and morally unacceptable within the group.
With regard to other measures against terrorism, the first step that should be taken
to deter terrorism is to be equipped with the expertise to detect a potential threat
beforehand and to be prepared for an attack. The next is to intensify security in
all susceptible areas, particularly in such places as airports, subway terminals,
etc. Surveillance of all people who are seen in such areas as are revealed to be
targets of terrorist acts is imperative. There should be more awareness of the threat
of terrorist activity particularly in international airports and international bus
and train terminals where travel documents should be checked and passengers double
checked. Electronic surveillance of passports and other documents have proved to
be effective methods of deterrence in this context. Perhaps the most important facet
of surveillance is the use of personnel who do not reveal their identity to the
public but unobtrusively mingle with the crowds. This category of person can easily
detect an irregularity without arousing suspicion and without alarming the common
man. It is recommended that together with the armed personnel there should also
be trained personnel who in all informality may work together with the security
forces in such instances. Another significant requirement is the support of the
people. The media should be made maximum use of to educate the common man as to
how to react in an emergency and also to be totally distrustful of the terrorist
whose acts are calculated to evoke sympathy. The State or persons against whom the
terrorist attack is launched should, at all times, use the media to convince the
public that responsibility for any destruction or harm resulting from a terrorist
act devolves totally on the terrorist.
-
Environmental Prospects for the Air Transport Industry
By: Ruwantissa Abeyratne
No one would dispute that air transport comes at a cost and that it contributes
approximately 2 percent of man-made carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.' However, it
can also not be denied that aviation plays a major role in international business.'
An IATA3 survey carried out in 2007 of over 600 companies from five countries revealed
that 3 percent confirmed that air transport networks were vital for their investments
and business.' Thirty percent of those companies said that any constraint placed
on the air transport industry would make them invest less. 'Airbus S.A.S. forecast
that demand between 2009 and 2028 would rise to 24,951 passenger and freight aircraft
worth US$ 3.1 trillion, an anticipated that by 2028 there would be 32,000 aircraft
in service compared with 15,750 in 2009.
Air transport plays an integral part in the tourism industry where 40 percent of
international tourists travel by air. Air transport contributes 10 percent of the
world's GDP' and employs approximately 80 million people worldwide. Yet, in the
decade 1999-2009, the industry lost US$56 billion. Given that over that period,
20 billion passengers were carried by air, the industry's average loss was US$2.8
per passenger. This shows both the indispensability of air transport to the global
economy on the one hand and the resilience of the industry on the other hand, to
be able to survive slow periods of growth followed by periods of losses. Against
this backdrop, the most significant fact is that the 32,000 aircraft in operation
in 2008 will have a much larger mission level of CO2 and other greenhouse gases
(GHGs)$ and therefore, the world will have to act strategically and swiftly if emission
levels from aircraft are to be maintained a sustainable development9 levels. It
follows that if the international community does not take radical action to reduce
GHGs on a global level in as little as ten years, the future generation will be
living in a planet unrecognizable to the present generation. One commentator has
said that the world is at a tipping point in climate change at present beyond which
there will be no redemption."
It is said that today, the amount of CO., methane, nitrous oxide, sculpture dioxide
and other GHGs that we breathe are all in excess of what the atmosphere has had
in 400,000 years. The concentrations of GHGs are rising at an alarming rate so much
that in the years since 1950 these gases have doubled in volume." This does not
portend well for the 6.7 billion people alive today (of whom 1 billion are in developed
countries which have been the source of around 70 percent of the emissions for the
past 50 years)." Although developed countries are the major polluters today, it
is thought that developing countries will exceed developed countries in their rates
of emissions.
Burning fossil fuels, be it by industry or the transport sector, is the prime cause
of global warming, which affects climate change. Climate change, which is a global
problem, is no longer a theory and has fast become an unequivocal reality and a
defining issue of our time. Its enormity can be identified numerically. For instance,
2005 was the warmest year on record. There has been a 33 percent rise in global
CO 2 emissions since 1987. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)14
records that 5 million extra people are at risk of hunger by the year 2020 if climate
change continues unabated. The 2003 heat wave killed 35,000 people in Europe. An
environmental campaigner says that there are palpable signs of drastic climate change
in the Arctic, which she calls the health barometer for the planet. Whatever happens
in the world occurs first in the Arctic the home of the Inuit. In 2004, the Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) concluded inter alia, on the basis of work carried
out by 300 scientists from 15 countries, that warming is likely to disrupt or even
destroy the Inuit hunting and food-sharing culture, as reduced sea ice causes populations
to decline or become extinct. The Inuit have lived in the Arctic for thousands of
years and their culture and economy reflect their homeland. Climate change in the
Arctic would therefore infringe the basic human right of the Inuit to life.
Shresta16 states that glaciers are retreating in the face of accelerating global
warming, as human activities cause steadily increasing concentrations of GHGs in
the atmosphere and their melting is an important indicator of climate change. This
is confirmed by the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, released in the first
half of 2007, which records that most of the observed increase in global average
temperatures since the mid 201 century is very likely due to the observed increase
in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. According to the Report, rising temperatures
in the Arctic have caused a decline of 2.7 percent of sea ice since 1978. A third
of the glacier surface in Bolivia and Peru has disappeared since the 1970s. The
Report concludes that climate change is one of the most critical global challenges
of our time.
Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his 2005 Report to the 59th Session
of the General Assembly, observed that one of the greatest environmental and developmental
challenges in the 21st century will be to control and cope with climate change.
The Secretary General drew the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that
entry into force in February 2005 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 17 was an important step toward
dealing with global warming. Since the Protocol extends only until 2012, the Secretary
General called upon the international community to agree on stabilization targets
for GHG concentrations beyond that date. To achieve this goal, scientific advancement
and technological innovation must be mobilized for carbon management and energy
efficiency, the responsibility for which lies with the countries that contribute
to most of the problems.
In 1997, at the 31 Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, States Parties
to the Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol, under which industrialized countries
agreed to reduce their collective emissions of six GHGs by at least 5 percent by
2012. Ambassador Raul Estrada-Oyuela, who had chaired the Committee of the Whole
established to facilitate the negotiations, expressed the view that the agreement
would have a real impact on the problem of GHG emissions and that 11 December 1997
should be remembered as the "Day of the Atmosphere".
The Kyoto Protocol, in Article 2(a)(v) calls each State Party to "implement and/or
further elaborate policies and measures ... such as progressive reduction or phasing
out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies
in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the
Convention and application of market instruments".
The subject of emissions leading to trading is addressed initially in Article 3
of the Protocol which requires Annex 1 Parties (whether individually or collectively)
to ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic COZ equivalent emissions of the GHGs
from a specific list of substances (Annex A) do not exceed their assigned amounts,
calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments
(Annex B). The stated objective of this provision is that States Parties to the
Protocol reduce their overall emissions of GHGs by at least 5 percent below 1990
levels in the commitment period 2008-2012. Article 3(6) provides States Parties
that are "undergoing the process of transition to a market economy" a degree of
flexibility in implementation of Article 3 and the reduction of their emission standards.
This approach has been endorsed by many learned and informed commentators, among
whom is former US Vice President Al Gore, who in his movie "An Inconvenient Truth"
highlighted the fact that the Earth's atmosphere is thin enough that we can change
its composition with the emissions we produce through industrial activity and transportation.
Gore, who has had a distinguished career both as a politician, serving as Vice President
under President Clinton, and also as an academic with impressive credentials, makes
the frightening but accurate claim that the vastly increasing levels of CO2 we produce
are thickening the atmosphere so that the rays of the Sun which fall on Earth and
bounce back as infrared rays beyond the atmosphere cannot escape the thick atmospheric
layer at the rate they did before and are trapped within, making the world warmer.
This phenomenon has resulted in CO2 being termed a greenhouse gas as it causes a
greenhouse effect by retaining heat within the atmosphere.
The environmental crisis that we face now derives mainly from solar energy, which
under normal circumstances and for years has been retained in quantities that benefit
the Earth in terms of the. balance of its ecosystem and biodiversity. The rest is
not being released as it should be, as more infrared rays are being trapped due
to the CO2-induced layer surrounding the atmosphere. The current scientific consensus
is that most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been
attributable to human activities specifically, the increase in atmospheric GHGs,
especially CO 2' due to activities such as burning of fossil fuels, land clearance,
and agriculture.
Another vocal commentator is George Moonboot, who claims that if in the year 2030,
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere remain as high as they are today, the likely
result is an increase of 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels, which is the point
beyond which certain major ecosystems begin collapsing. The collapse of one's environment
would eventually bring about catastrophic results and threaten human existence.
Against this backdrop this article will address the environmental prospects or the
air transport industry over the next few years. Regulatory Measures Taken So Far
at The ICAO High Level Meeting.
The first International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)19 meeting exclusively
dedicated to aviation and climate change, was convened in Montreal from 7-9 October
2009, followed by the Conference on Aviation and Alternative Fuels (CAAF) at Rio
de Janeiro in Brazil from 16-18 November 2009.20 In the words of Roberto Kobeh Gonzales,
President of the ICAO Council, this process was about leadership from ICAO and its
Contracting States in limiting or reducing emissions from international civil aviation
that contribute to global warming.
ICAO has carried out work relating to aviation CO2 emissions for the past 10 years
and relating to other forms of emissions for several decades. This has included
examining and developing a range of technological and operational measures for reducing
aviation emissions, developing various guidance documents on market-based measures
(MBMs) and detailed analyses of MBMs pursuant to resolutions in the past General
Assemblies. In these efforts, ICAO has considered, inter alia, options for COZ based
aviation emissions charges and emissions trading, and voluntary measures.
ICAO's 2009 Climate Change meeting began with a sound basis for starting work the
Program me of Action by the Group on International Civil Aviation and Climate Change
(GIACC) '22 which had been mandated in 2007 by the ICAO Assembly to develop and
recommend such a program me, based on consensus, and reflecting the shared vision
and strong will of Contracting States. Submitted in May 2009, the Program me was
reviewed and approved by the ICAO Council, which convened the High-level Meeting
with a view to preparing a position on aviation and climate change for the 151 Meeting
of the UNFCCC COP-15 to be held in December 2009 in Copenhagen.
The GIACC Report : GIACC held four meetings after receiving its mandate from
the ICAO Assembly, focusing on inspirational goals and MBMs. The final GIACC Report
and its Program me recommended global inspirational goals in the form of short-,
medium- and long-term fuel efficiency:
- An annual fuel efficiency improvement of 2 percent by 2012 for the short term;
- An annual fuel efficiency improvement of 2 percent from 2013-2020 for the medium
term; and
- An annual fuel efficiency improvement of 2 percent from 2021-2050 for the long term
GIACC was not able to achieve the part of its mandate which called for consensus
on developing goals which demonstrate a stronger ambition. The goals adopted compare
to the goals expressed by IATA,24 essentially equivalent of a short-term goal of
about 2.1 percent annual fuel efficiency improvement by 2012, a medium-term goal
of about 1.9 percent per annum improvement by 2020 and a long-term goal of about
1.1 percent per annum reduction by 2050.
The GIACC discussed in depth the role of MBMs in reducing the climate impact of
international aviation, but consensus to apply those measures was not achieved.
GIACC recommended that an MBM development process be established, and that it take
into account major issues related to their implementation, in particular:
- The principles of non-discrimination and equal and fair opportunities set forth
in the Chicago Convention;
- The specific circumstances and different capabilities of each Contracting State
and region;
- The inclusion of the most effective and efficient measures only;
- The facilitation of industry compliance;
- The need for coordination and non-duplication among MBMs; and
- geographical scope issues.
The goals agreed by GIACC will not impose specific expectations on individual States.
The different circum-stances, respective capabilities and contribution of developing
and developed States to the concentration of aviation GHG emissions in the atmosphere
will determine how each State may contribute to achieving global inspirational goals.
GIACC expressed support for the development of a CO2 standard for new aircraft types
and agreed to a basket of measures that can be selected by States to apply to their
international aviation sector in line with their circumstances and capabilities,
and which include measures to facilitate access to assistance, particularly for
developing countries.
The need for accurate and complete data on aviation traffic and fuel burn was recognized
and further work by the Secretariat under Article 67 of the Chicago Convention 21
was recommended, including the provision of technical and financial support to developing
countries. GIACC also recommended that the Council encourage each State to develop
its own action plan, which articulates its proposed approach to reduction of climate
change effects from their international aviation sector. At the end of its deliberations,
the Meeting adopted a Declaration which inter alia welcomed and endorsed the Decision
of the ICAO Council to fully accept the Program me of Action on International Aviation
and Climate Change, including global inspirational goals regarding fuel efficiency
and a basket of measures and the means to measure progress, as an important first
step in the work of Contracting States at ICAO to address GHG emissions from international
aviation. It also reaffirmed ICAO as the lead UN agency in matters involving international
civil aviation, and emphasized ICAO's commitment to providing continuous leadership
in international civil aviation matters related to the environment. The Declaration
went on to acknowledge the principles and provisions on common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, and the fact that developed countries
will be taking the lead under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It also acknowledged
the principles of non-discrimination and equal and fair opportunities to develop
international aviation set forth in the Chicago Convention and re-emphasized the
vital role which international aviation plays in global economic and social development
and the need to ensure that international aviation continues to develop in a sustainable
manner.
States affirmed through the Declaration that, in pursuing the implementation of
the ICAO Program me of Action on International Aviation and Climate Change, States
and relevant organizations will work through ICAO to achieve a global annual average
fuel efficiency improvement of 2 percent by 2020 and an inspirational global fuel
efficiency improvement rate of 2 percent per annum in the long term from 2021-2050,
calculated on the basis of volume of fuel used per revenue tone kilometer performed.
Taking into account the relevant outcomes of the UNFCCC COP-15, and recognizing
that the Declaration should not prejudge the outcome of those negotiations, ICAO
and its Contracting States, together with the relevant organizations, pledged to
continue working together on medium and long-term goals. These include exploring
the feasibility of goals of more ambition including carbon-neutral growth and emissions
reductions, taking into account the collective commitments announced by Airports
Council International (ACI), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO),
IATA and ICCAIA26 on behalf of the international air transport industry, the special
circumstances and respective capabilities of developing countries and the sustainable
growth of the international aviation industry, for consideration by the 37th Session
of the ICAO Assembly.
Alternative Fuels : There are currently no sustainable alternative fuels
for aircraft in commercial production. However, change is expected in the near future.
Planning is underway for the production of new fuels with low life-cycle emissions.
When these fuels enter the market, their costs will be high and they may require
subsidies or production incentives in order to make them economically viable. As
industry gains more experience producing these fuels their costs will decrease,
as will their life-cycle GHG emissions. In the long term, industry may design new
aircraft and engines to take advantage of unconventional aircraft fuels with extremely
low life-cycle CO2 emissions.
Sustainable alternative fuels for aircraft can be produced from a wide variety of
feed stocks. Sources of oil-producing plants such as camelina, moringa, babacu,
macauba, jatropha, halophytes and algae are already being evaluated for fuel production.
These plants and others can be grown in countries around the world, often with optimum
production in particular developing countries or regions. Thus, new sustainable
alternative fuels for aircraft may be better suited for regional and local production
in countries around the world in light of the variety of potential feeds tocks.
With a relatively low energy density, especially compared to crude oil, it is often
uneconomic to ship feed stocks over long distances, necessitating local production.
Once refined into fuel, the particular source feedstock used is irrelevant to the
aircraft.
Most of the feeds tocks studied to date also produce by-products that may be of
value locally. Communities may be able to develop new businesses or other sources
of income from alternative fuel production. To meet these objectives, significant
investment will be needed in regions where States desire to become producers of
sustainable alternative fuels for aircraft.
In the short term, sustainable alternative fuels for aircraft may be available in
limited quantities and have a life-cycle CO2 footprint equal to, or less than, conventional
jet fuel. It will be necessary to blend these alternative fuels with conventional
jet fuel at up to a maximum of 50 percent to produce a drop-in fuel. Drop-in jet
fuels are completely interchangeable with conventional jet fuel, and so will not
require modification of fuel handling and distribution systems, including gauges,
meters, fuelling vehicles and hydrant systems, as well as aircraft engines, once
the fuels have been blended.
GHG emission reductions in the short term will be limited as sustainable alternative
fuels for aircraft are initially introduced. For example, assuming the life-cycle
CO2 footprint of sustainable alternative fuels for aircraft provides a 20 percent
reduction compared with conventional jet fuel and a 50 percent fuel blend makes
up 10 percent of the total jet fuel market, the GHG emissions reduction would be
1 percent compared to forecast emissions without the new fuels. However, reductions
in particulate matter and sculpture oxides will be more significant. Achieving air
quality benefits from the use of these fuels is independent of production life-cycle
considerations.
In the medium term, it is possible that sustainable alternative fuels for aircraft
will be available in much larger quantities. The significant research and development
activity currently underway is expected to lead to a number of commercial-scale
production facilities. The Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI)
is currently seeking to ensure that at least 10 alternative jet fuel production
facilities are built and in operation within five years.27 Also, these new fuels
will have been certified for greater use in blends, possibly up to 100 percent alternative
fuel, thus moving from drop-in blend fuels to drop-in neat fuels according to industry
roadmaps. During this time, the fuels may even reach cost parity, especially if
the value of their carbon reduction benefits is accounted for.
As the aviation industry increases its use of sustainable alternative fuels for
aircraft, on-going efforts will be applied to reduce the life-cycle impacts of these
fuels. These may include: thoroughly exploring and identifying feedstock resources;
enhancing resource quality; improving oil recovery and extraction; finding markets
for co-products; creating higher value co-products; improving the efficiency of
converting raw befouls to jet fuel; and reducing the length and number of transport
links.
As for long-term availability of these fuels, the aviation industry may explore
more radical fuels that require redesigned engines and airframes. Fuels such as
liquid hydrogen and liquid methane might be used to significantly reduce GHG emissions.28
Managing these cryogenic liquids on an aircraft will require heat exchangers to
vaporize and heat the fuel prior to use on-board29 and the fuel supply infrastructure
will need to be substantially redesigned or replaced. While new aircraft designs
and new fuel production pathways may be required, these new approaches may result
in more sustainable alternative fuels for aviation, particularly Costs Associated
with Sustainable Alternative Fuels for aircraft will remain highly uncertain. As
a result, these fuels will likely require subsidies or incentives, at least initially,
to encourage their production given the risks involved in moving from pilot scale
to commercialization.
The International Energy Agency has projected costs for second-generation befoul
plants producing biodiesel to fall an average of 2.5 percent/year between 2010 and
2030 (a reduction of approximately 40 percent). Since there are no sustainable alternative
fuels for aircraft being produced today, a specific cost-reduction curve cannot
be developed or confirmed for these fuels. There are, however, many projects in
various stages of development whose investors believe they can quickly reach cost
parity with conventional fuels, although their financial plans and forecasts have
not been made public.
With most of the feed stocks presently being evaluated, a substantial portion of
the mass will end up as a by-product of fuel production. Finding markets for by-products
(or co-products) will be important for overall process economics. Some high-value
markets are available today for select bio-oils, such as nutraceuticals, which are
used as nutritional supplements and feed stocks for pharmaceutical production. These
materials represent a small part of the total oil produced, and large-scale fuel
production may have a significant impact on their market value. Other by-products,
such as meal, may be used for animal feed, solid fuel, or similar low-value products;
however, these materials will be an important consideration in overall process economics.
The foregoing discussion suggests that development of new sustainable alternative
fuels for aircraft production processes may be able to reduce costs of fuels to
compete with conventional jet fuel in the mid-term alternative fuels and incentives
to overcome initial regions are candidate locations for sustainable alternative
feed stocks, only those that attract sufficient investment will achieve a market
presence.
In its specific focus on Alternative Aviation Fuel, the (GFAAF) produced a Declaration
issued by the meeting, which inter alia adopted a Global Framework for Aviation
Alternative Fuels (GFAAF),31 as part of the Declaration issued by the meeting, which
also specifically suggested, inter alia, the following:
- That ICAO and its Member States endorse the use of sustainable alternative fuels
for aviation, particularly the use of drop-in fuels in the short to mid-term, as
an important means of reducing aviation emissions;
- That ICAO establish a Global Framework for Aviation Alternative Fuels (GFAAF) on
aviation and sustainable alternative fuels to communicate what individual and shared
efforts expect to achieve with sustainable alternative fuels for aviation in the
future for consideration by the 370' Session of the ICA Assembly;32
- That GFAAF will be continually updated;
- That Member States and stakeholders work together through ICAO and other relevant
international bodies, to exchange information and best practices and in particular
to reach a common definition of sustainability requirements for alternative fuels;
- That Member States are encouraged to work together development, deployment and usage
of sustainable alternative fuels for aviation;
- That funding efforts that support the study and development of sustainable alternative
fuels and other measures to reduce GHG emissions, in addition to the funding for
research and technology program me to further improve the efficiency of air transport,
be maintained or improved;
- That Member States are encouraged to establish policies that support the use of
sustainable alternative aviation fuels, ensure that such fuels are available to
aviation and avoid unwanted or negative side effects, which could compromise the
environmental benefits of alternative fuels;
- That the ICAO Council should further elaborate on measures to assist developing
States as well as to facilitate access to financial resources, technology transfer
and capacity building;
- That there is an urgent need for measures to facilitate access to financial resources,
technology exchange, and capacity building specific to sustainable aviation alternative
fuels;
- That ICAO takes the necessary steps with the aim of considering a framework for
financing infrastructure development projects dedicated to sustainable aviation
alternative fuels and incentives to overcome initial market hurdles;
- That ICAO continue to facilitate efforts to develop a life-cycle analysis framework
for comparing the relative GHG emissions from sustainable alternative fuels to the
life cycle of conventional fuels for aviation; and
- That ICAO and its Member States should strongly encourage wider discussions on the
development of alternative fuel technologies and support the use of sustainable
alternative fuels, including befouls, in aviation in accordance with national circumstances.
It is worthy of note that one of the recommendations calls for ICAO to organize
a meeting of States, financial institutions, fuel producers, feedstock producers,
aircraft manufacturers and operators to consider the critical issues of cost and
financing infrastructure projects dedicated to aviation alternative fuels and incentives
to overcome initial market hurdles. ICAO pledged to carry out the following key
activities with a view to supporting the objectives of GFAAF:
- Providing fore for education and outreach on sustainable alternative fuels for aviation;
- Providing fore for facilitating the exchange of information on financing and incentives
for sustainable alternative fuels for aviation programmers working with the relevant
UN and regional financial entities;
- Facilitating development of standardized definitions, methodologies and processes
to support the development of sustainable alternative fuels for aviation, taking
into consideration the work that has been done so far in this area; and
- Supporting a platform for access to research roadmaps and programmers.
The Conference provided a global forum for the 190 Member States of ICAO to discuss
this issue in preparation for UNFCCC COP-15; it adopted the Fuel Readiness Level
(FRL) developed by the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI),
as a best practice; defined drop-in jet fuel blend and drop-in neat jet fuel; recommended
the use of life-cycle analysis as the appropriate means for comparing the relative
emissions from alternative jet fuels to conventional jet fuel; endorsed the use
of the existing industry qualification and certification processes as the appropriate
means for approving a new alternative jet fuel; and made every effort to ensure
the consideration of aviation alternative fuels within relevant international, regional
and State efforts to develop sustainability criteria for all alternative fuels.
After the Conference, ICAO has offered the view that sustainable drop-in alternative
fuels produced from biomass or renewable oils offer the potential to reduce life-cycle
GHG emissions and therefore reduce aviation's contribution to global climate change.
Sustainable alternative fuels could be an important tool in the efforts to close
the mitigation gap while allowing the sector to respond to growing demand, and the
use of such fuels may also offer reduced emissions of particulate matter, lessening
aviation's impact on air quality as a result of the significantly lower fuel sculpture
content.33
Future Prospects : Common but Differentiated Responsibilities In addressing
climate targets, the first challenge that air transport must face is the concept
of common but differentiated responsibilities upon which the UNFCCC is based. This
is particularly challenging for ICAO, which is based on the principle of one vote
per nation and is grounded on the principle of non-discrimination. The Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities principle is enshrined in Principle 7 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development34 under which states shall cooperate
in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities.
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility they bear in the international
pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place
on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.
Principle 7 enshrines the equitable norm that States may use resources according
to their capabilities and limitations and that nations with varying capabilities
must be treated accordingly. The core thrust of the principle is global partnership
and international cooperation. Therefore both developed and developing countries
have a common goal of protecting the global environment. Principle 7 also denotes
the ecological interdependence of all States. A cardinal principle of public international
law is sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States.35 An inevitable corollary
to this principle is that legal obligations are based on reciprocity which binds
each State equally. However, since States vary in size, capability and economic
strength, substantively equal treatment becomes difficult, thus paving the way for
differentiation of responsibility among States.
In the past, such differentiation has been applied at various instances in the United
Nations, such as the Security Council where five permanent members enjoy equal veto
powers but other member States of the UN do not have this power. Similarly Principle
7 differentiates between countries in determining the degree of responsibility that
a country has in addressing and remedying an environmental problem.36 It also requires
all States to participate globally in having a common approach towards addressing
environmental problems by adopting environmental standards (an approach which is
commonly called commonality of responsibility).
However, it admits of different obligations for certain countries, taking into account
mitigating factors such as their share of responsibility for aggravating a particular
environmental problem (which is commonly called "differences in obligation").37
Thus, owing to their peculiar circumstances, States have different capacities at
different stages of development and ineluctably different levels of responsibility
and kinds of obligations for addressing international environmental issues. As a
result, the principle allows a certain flexibility in terms of how different categories
of States address specific environmental threats. Thus, in international environmental
law, different groups of countries may often be given different timetables to implement
a common commitment.38
Treaties also include technology transfer and aid mechanisms, both of which serve
to address the concerns of countries with less ability to implement the obligations
imposed by the treaty. For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)39
provides inter alia that "for the purposes of financing ... consideration shall
be given to the special situation of developing countries" :40
Usually, the common-but-differentiated-responsibility principle is applied in terms
of developed and developing countries with regard to environmental protection by
explicitly affirming higher standards for developed States.41 The rationale behind
this practice is to encourage developing countries to commit to the idea of environmental
responsibility, whilst not unduly pressurizing them to carry out responsibilities
in the same manner as developed countries who may contribute more to environmental
pollution and also be better able to mitigate it. Therefore, by implication, developed
countries must assume a greater responsibility for environmental protection than
developing countries there is also the understanding that when the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities is incorporated into international environmental
law, there is a requirement for developed countries to exercise leadership by example
in an effort to prevent and/or curb environmental pollution.42
Some argue that the Principle could result in economic advantage to developing countries.
Applying the Principle could bring in less demanding environmental obligations and
encourage industries to relocate from developed to developing countries. It is argued
that the result may be job loss in developed countries and job creation in developing
If everybody does what they are best at, rather than what they are just good at,
and does only that, everybody will be better off. You don't have to be the very
best at anything. In fact, you don't have to be better than your trading partner
at anything. All that matters is that you produce what you are least worst at.43
The application of this theory to responsibility for emissions implies that the
right to emit has become a huge economic advantage, which makes emissions migrate
to those who cannot manage them.'
Carbon Markets and Calculating Carbon Offsets : Carbon markets are a result
of carbon trading through offsets introduced by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.
The carbon market now trades US$120 billion per year. It is envisioned that, by
2025, the market will reach US$3 trillion and it is expected to be the largest commodity
market in the world.45 The purpose of carbon markets is to increase mitigation of
the effects of GHGs by providing a financial incentive to those entities that are
eligible to reduce their carbon emissions ' According to the World Bank's 2009 Report
.
The overall carbon market continued to grow in 2008, reaching a total value transacted
of about US$126 billion (€86 billion) at the end of the year, double its 2007 value.
Approximately US$92billion (€63 billion) of this overall value is accounted for
by transactions of allowances and derivatives under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) for compliance, risk management, arbitrage, raising cash and profit-taking
purposes. The second largest segment of the carbon market was the secondary market
for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which is a financial market with spot,
futures and options transactions in excess of US$26 billion, or €18 billion, representing
a fivefold increase in both value and volume over 2007. These trades do not directly
give rise to emission reductions unlike transactions in the primary market 47.
For the purpose of carbon offsets, emissions are calculated on the basis of quantity
of fuel burned, or units of other energy sources such as electricity that are expended.
In terms of aviation and the environment, one expert states that much of the uncertainty
about calculating the environmental impact of aviation emissions derives from the
fact that emissions at altitude can instigate a host of chemical reactions in the
atmosphere, which each have global warming and cooling effects over a variety of
timescales, varying from less than 1 day to several hundred years. The overall effect
is certainly one of an increased warming effect compared to emissions at ground
level, but the extent of this remains open to debate, both in terms of how to calculate
the magnitude of this effect, and what the value should be.48
The problem about calculating fuel burn is that much of it would be based on assumptions
such as the type of aircraft and an extrapolation of trans boundary pollution between
origin and destination. Detail on the assumptions underlying these figures is beyond
the scope of this paper, but can be found in the literature. It is only necessary
to note that some calculators may use a multiplier as high as 4, whilst others may
regard the issue of a multiplier as too contentious, and deal only with the warming
effects of CO2.
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) : The EU ETS is perhaps the
most far reaching from a global perspective. Under this scheme, by 2012, the EU
Member States (responsible for about22 percent of global CO2 emissions) are required
to reduce their CO2 emissions to on average 8 percent below their 1990 levels as
part of the commitments of the Kyoto Protocol. Each Member State has been given
a fixed number of emission rights, and should not emit more than the number of rights
it possesses. Such a reduction will be useful to fight climate change, but quite
a few important countries (most notably, the Third World, India, China, the United
States and Australia) have not committed themselves to similar emission caps.
According to the EU ETS, each country has the flexibility to achieve emissions reductions
in several ways, including energy savings, reforms in the transport sector and stimulating
renewable energies. Some commentators disagree over the ETS approach and whether
the scheme will be a success or not.
Most relevant to this article, the EU member States have granted industry/power
companies a number of special emissions rights. Specifically, operators are allocated
emission allowances (one tone of CO2 per year), with the total number of allowances
allocated limited according to the overall emissions from the activities covered
by the Scheme. By 30 April each year, operators must surrender allowances to cover
their actual emissions. Operators can trade allowances so that emissions reductions
can be made where they are most cost-effective. In addition to allowances allocated
under the Scheme, operators can also use credits from emission-reduction projects
under the Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation and ‘Clean Development Mechanism)
to cover their emissions.
The relevant European Union directive (2003/87/EC,49 amended by Directive 2008/101/EC
on 13 January 2009) originally included the aviation sector in the EU ETS. In 2011,
only flights between EU airports would be included in the Scheme. From 2012, this
would be extended to all flights50 arriving at or departing from an EU airport.
Where a third country had measures in place to reduce the climate change impact
of aviation, the Scheme would not apply to flights arriving from that country. The
objective of the proposal was to provide a model for aviation emissions trading
that could be a point of reference in the EU's contacts with key international partners
and to promote the development of similar systems worldwide. The Commission also
supported the objective of a global agreement aimed at effectively tackling aviation
emissions at global level.
The key aspects of the proposal are that aircraft operators would be the entities
responsible for complying with the obligations imposed by the Scheme. Under the
proposal, each aircraft operator, including operators from third countries, would
be administered by one Member State only, in order to avoid duplication and an excessive
administrative burden on aircraft operators. Initially, the Scheme would only cover
CO2 emissions although there the end of 2008.
Another feature of the proposal was that, in contrast to the existing Scheme, the
method of allocating allowances would be harmonized at the level of the EU and not
at Member-State level. The Scheme calls for the total number of allowances allocated
to the aviation sector to be determined by reference to average emissions from aviation
in the years 2004-2006. The majority of allowances would be allocated free of charge
on the basis of a benchmark to aircraft operators which submit an application (the
earliest application relating to 2008 data). There is also provision for a small
proportion of allowances to be auctioned.51 thereafter, the percentage auctioned
would be decided in the light of the results of the general review of the EU ETS.52
Scheme requires aircraft operators, like other participants, to monitor their emissions
of CO2 and report them to the competent authority of their administering Member
State by 31 March each year. The reports would be independently verified to make
sure that they are accurate. The basic principles for monitoring, reporting and
verifying emissions set out in the proposal would be elaborated by guidelines. If
necessary, aircraft operators would be able to buy allowances from other sectors
in the Scheme to cover increases in their emissions. Aircraft operators would also
be able to use project credits - so-called Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and Certified
Emission Reductions (CERs) - from the Joint Implementation or Clean Development
Mechanisms (JI/CDM) provided for in the Kyoto Protocol up to a harmonized limit
equivalent to the average of the limits applied by EU Member States for other sectors
in the EU ETS. The Scheme would also apply to domestic aviation which would be treated
in the same way as international aviation.
According to the European EU ETS, each participant should have a monitoring plan
for annual emissions and for data calculated on a tone kilometer basis. Responsibility
devolves upon the aircraft operator to develop and maintain sustainable monitoring
plans. The monitoring plans were to be submitted by 31 August 2009 and implementation
was to commence by 1 January 2010. Prior to drafting the monitoring plan, the operator
is required to verify and determine whether he came under the EU ETS; the administering
State; the flights to be monitored; and whether the particular operator is eligible
for simplified procedures for small emitters.
The EU ETS recognizes that the carbon market has to be endowed with sufficient liquidity
to facilitate trading, but that pricing information must be readily available. Market
platforms should therefore provide such factors as lower trading costs, reduced
default risk, guaranteed anonymity for participants, rapid execution of transactions
and price transparency.53 In this regard; Europe is developing a financial industry
and infrastructure that would drive carbon allowances.
Conclusion : Clearly, even with carbon trading and/or alternative fuel development,
it is not envisioned that the aviation industry could give up the use of fossil
fuels altogether in the near future. One of the more important topics which were
discussed at UNFCCC COP-15 was the continued relationship between the UNFCCC, the
ICAO and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) with regard to emissions
from international aviation and shipping.
Both ICAO and IMO were of the strong view that they should continue to be responsible
for dealing with reductions in emissions from their respective industries and sought
guidance from UNFCCC COP-15. Within these discussions, Ethiopia proposed to introduce
levies on international aviation and shipping, calculated to help developing countries
raise funds in the nature of billions of dollars needed to cope with issues of climate
change. This proposal was backed by Australia, Britain and France. The Conference,
which fizzled out into a watered-down agreement between five countries did not offer
any specific guidelines in the context of aviation or maritime affairs.
The 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly will include input based on the High-level
Meeting, CAAF and UNFCCC COP-15 that will encourage Member States to develop policy
actions to accelerate the appropriate development, deployment and use of such fuels
and to work together through ICAO and other relevant international bodies, to exchange
information and best practices, and in particular to reach a common definition of
sustainability requirements and to work together expeditiously with the industry
to foster the development and implementation of sustainable alternative fuels for
aviation. Integral to this approach would be the need to ensure that policy recommendations
and decisions considered by ICAO and individual States take into account environmental,
social and economic sustainability aspects, as well as technical requirements including
safety aspects. Member States should also be urged to invite industry to actively
participate in further work on sustainable alternative fuels for aviation facilitated
by ICAO, and the Assembly should be advised of initiatives by States and other organizations
related to sustainable alternative fuels for aviation. The ICAO Council should,
as recommended by CAAF, commit to further elaborate on measures to assist developing
States as well as to facilitate access to financial resources; technology transfer
and capacity building.
It would be incorrect to assume that the task of minimizing the deleterious effects
on the environment caused by aviation should devolve upon ICAO alone. This should
be a collective effort on the part of the entire aviation industry. Government,
industry and the travelling public will need to invest in order to deliver technological
innovation, development and carbon-free flight.
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Cyber terrorism and aviation—national and international
responses
By: Ruwantissa Abeyratne
Abstract : Cyber crimes and cyber terrorism are becoming increasingly menacing
and the latter has been identified as a distinct threat requiring attention. At
the 21st Aviation Security Panel Meeting of ICAO (AVSECP/21, 22 to 26 March 2010)
a new Recommended Practice related to cyber threats was proposed for adoption by
the Council as part of amendment 12 to Annex 17 (Security) to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). It was adopted on 17 November
2010, will become effective on 26 March 2011 and applicable on 1 July 2011. This
Recommended Practice suggests that each Contracting State develop measures inorder
to protect information and communication technology systems used for civil aviation
purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civilaviation. At the
22nd Meeting ofthe Panel,conducted by ICAO from 21 to 25 March 2011, the Panelnoted
the value of vulnerability assessments pertaining to cyber security in aviation
whose objectives are to evaluate the efficiency of existing mitigation measures
and identify any vulnerabilities from a threat-based perspective and further noted
that better understanding of residual risks will support a State’s efforts to refine
its risk response. This article contains an analysis of what cyber crimes are as
against cyber terrorism, measures taken to counter the threat along with a legal
analysis of the threat as it affects aviation and addresses several issues, including
a discussion on some national efforts at curbing the problem in some prominent jurisdictions.
Introduction : Cyber Terrorism defines our times. It has brought seismic
changes to the way we approach terrorism. This is because global and national reliance
placed on cyberspace for the development and sustenance of human interaction will
continue to grow in the years to come and with that continued development will come
ominous threats and daunting challenges from cyber terrorism. Cyber terrorism has
the advantage of anonymity, which in turn enables the hacker to obviate checkpoints
or any physical evidence being traceable to him.It is a low budget form of terrorism
where the only costs entailed in interfering with the computer programs of a State’s
activities and stability would be those pertaining to the right computer equipment.
The most intractable challenge posed by cyber terrorism is that the digital environment
that we live in, which enables us to create and share knowledge also provides ample
opportunity for the commission of a cyber crime since that environment breeds motivated
offenders who can develop covert capabilities that could exploit the vulnerability
of the cyber environment. The opportunities the cyber environment offers for subterfuge
is another challenge to be overcome. However, the most ominous challenge is the
lack of sentinels to guard against crimes committed against the digital world.
At the outset, it is necessary to determine the difference, if any, between cyber
crime and cyber terrorism and ascertain any link that reflects a commonality. Cyber
crime was called“computer crime” in its early stages of evolution and has been called“computer
related crime” or“crime by computer”. Cyber terrorism has been simplistically defined
as “an assault on electronic communication networks”. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
has given a more extensive definition: “the premeditated, politically motivated
attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which
result in violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents”. One commentator states that cyber terrorism is terrorism in cyberspace,
which is carried out through computers, the Internet and technology-based networks
or systems against infrastructures supported by computers and networks.7 Another
interpretation is that cyber terrorism is the use of computer networks in order
to harm human life or to sabotage critical national infrastructure in a way that
may cause harm to human life When all these definitions are considered one notes
that the activities concerned with both cyber crime and cyber terrorism are calculated
to sabotage infrastructure and disrupt a system. Therefore, although the activities
involved may be the same or similar in both categories the intent behind a cyber
crime may be different from that which applies to cyber terrorism. The Centre for
the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare released a report in 1999 which discussed
the likelihood of any significant cyber attacks experienced in the future being
supplementary to traditional physical attacks carried out by terrorists.
It has been argued that cyber terrorism is a corollary to a shift of control in
manufacturing utilities, banking and communications from secured national control
to networked computers. The threat of cyber terrorism resonates the terrifying truth
that its occurrence is real and the extent of occurrence of cyber terrorist acts
could be prodigious. Blaise Pascal, in his book Ars Cogitandi states that fear of
harm ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of the harm but also to
the probability of the event. Fundamentals of risk management tell us that, under
similar conditions, the occurrence of an event in the future will follow the same
pattern following the past. It follows therefore that we could be faced with the
terrifying possibility of a nuclear 9/11 sometime in the future, possibly aided
and abetted by cyber terrorism.
The events of 11 September 2001 revealed that the three most vulnerable targets
for terrorist attacks are people, infrastructure and technology as they are the
preeminent elements of a functional economy in this century. They also brought to
bear the inextricable interdependencies between physical and cyber infrastructures.
Cyber terrorism represents a “clear and present danger” and the issue has even been
raised as to whether 9/11 was a result of cyber terrorism.
Cyberspace, which comprises millions of fibre optic cables enabling servers, computers
and routers, is the nervous system of any nation’s critically important infrastructures,
prominent among which is transportation. Attacks on cyberspace can cause immeasurable
harm, particularly by disrupting essential services such as banking and finance,
telecommunications, health and health care, transportation, religious places of
worship, infrastructures, government services, education centers, power and energy
generation and distribution, manufacturing, agriculture and food, electricity and
water supply, and military defence. Of these, aerospace activities and air traffic
control are significant targets.
As far back as 1999, President Clinton, in a speech to the National Academy of Sciences
said:“open borders and revolutions in technology have spread the message and the
gifts of freedom, but have also given new opportunities to freedom’senemies… we
must be ready…ready if our adversaries try to use computers to disable power grids,
banking, communications and transportation networks, police, fire, and health services—
ormilitaryassets. In pursuit of this objective, the President outlined his strategy
driven by a new program called “Cyber Corps,” that would supplement and support
already existing government efforts to respond to counter cyber terrorism while
introducing new strategies calculated to strengthen the protection of critical systems.
President Clinton further stated that he would seek Congress support to allocate
$1.46 billion in the next federal budget to fund his proposal which involved a 40%
increase from previous spending on such efforts. This proposed measure was seemingly
timely since, according to a survey conducted in 2002 by the FBI andaSanFranciscobasedcomputersecurity
institute, 90% of large corporations and government agencies in the United States
had experienced unauthorized computer breaches in 2001.
In 2003, The United States adopted theNational Strategy to Secure Cyberspace under
the signature of President Bush, with a view to preventing cyber attacks against
critical infrastructures of the United States; reducing national vulnerability to
cyber attacks and minimizing damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do
occur. The Strategy outlines the national priority which is securing the Government’scyberspaceandnational
security and international cyberspace security cooperation. These priorities will
be driven with the assistance of a national cyberspace security response system;
a national cyberspace security threat and vulnerability reduction programme; and
a national cyberspace security awareness and training programme. A fundamental principle
of this strategy lies in the recognition that efforts to counter cyber terrorism
would involve robust and active collaboration between the variouscomponentsinvolvedintheactivitiesofthe
United States. This is simply becausethefederalgovernmentcouldnot—and, should not
—secure nor interfere with the computer networks of privately owned banks, energy
companies, transportation firms, and other parts of the private sector. In similar
manner, the federal government should not intrude into homes and small businesses,
into universities, or state and local agencies and departments to create secure
computer networks. The Strategy therefore exhorts each Americanwhodependsoncyberspaceand
information networks, to secure the part thattheyownorforwhichtheyareresponsible.
The extent of the threat posed by cyber terrorism is reflected in the Annual Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
of 2010 which states that the agility and technological innovation demonstrated
by the cyber criminal sector far exceeds the response capability of network defenders.
The Threat Assessment identified Network Convergence—which is the merging of distinct
voice and data technologies to a point where all communicationsare relayed over
a common network structure—and Channel Consolidation—which is the concentration
of data captured on individual users by service providers through emails or instant
messaging—as being particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks. The Threat Assessment
drew an implicit parallel between cyber terrorism and international organized crime,
expanding that international criminal organizations will increasingly damage the
ability of legitimate businesses to compete and may drive some legitimate players
out of the market.
Cyber terrorism, whether conducted by individuals, corporations or States could
target the electronic systems of companies which design and develop hardware and
software used in airports, air traffic control systems. It could target industries
involved in the construction of aircraft and components whether they be used for
civil or military purposes. One commentator says: here, the objective is that of
manipulating, in the design phase, software or hardware which will eventually come
to be used in critical environments. The events linked to the theft of designs relating
to the American F-35 project 15 are an example of this kind of act.
A US Government review conducted in 2010 is reported to have revealed that the computer
systems of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) remain vulnerable to cyber
attacks as most air traffic control facilities have not been upgraded to respond
adequately to cyber intrusions. The threat of cyber terrorism is reported to have
been extended to the Boeing Dreamliner 787 in that the FAA is reported to have claimed
that“the plane may be at risk for hacking on to its on-board computer system, with
disastrous consequences”. In the context of aviation, cyber terrorism is a hydra
headed monster which can affect air transport in numerous ways. Cyber terrorist
acts could be used to spread disinformation or to engage in psychological warfare
where media attention could be manipulated regarding possible threats, which would
in all likelihood cause disruption to airport and aircraft operations. This could
result in the“fear factor” that was seen as an immediate aftermath of 9/11 where
persons showed great reluctance to travel. This could result in economic loss, particularly
to nations depending on the tourism industry to boost their GNP. In its most serious
form, cyber-terrorism could lead tofatalities, injuries and major damage at airports
and to aircraft in flight.
Legal Discussion
International Efforts :Offences against civil aviation, particularly
with regard to unlawful interference with civil aviation relating to aircraft have
been addressed in three significant occasions in the Tokyo Convention of 1963, The
Hague Convention of 1970 and the Montreal Convention of 1971. However none of these
directly or indirectly referred to cyber terrorism. For the first time, the 2010
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
adopted in Beijing in Article 1 d) provides that an offence is committed when a
person destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation,
if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight. This undoubtedly
refers, inter alia to cyber terrorism, but links the offence exclusively to the
safety of aircraft in flight. Article 2a) of the Convention provides that the aircraft
is considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external
doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened
for disembarkation; in the case of a forced landing, the flight would be deemed
to continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the
aircraft and for persons and property on board. If therefore as a result of an act
of cyber terrorism, a taxiing aircraft collides with an aircraft which has opened
its doors for disembarkation but the passengers are still on board awaiting disembarkation,
that act would not be considered an offence in terms of the passengers in the process
of disembarkation. In other words, the offender would not be committing an offence
under the Treaty either against the second aircraft or its disembarking passengers.
Nonetheless, the Beijing Treaty of 2010 is a step forward in the right direction
with the threat of cyber terrorism looming, affecting the peace of nations. Air
transport could well be a target towards the erosion of that peace.
On a more general basis, and certainly of relevance to aviation, are the efforts
of various international organizations such as the United Nations, Council of Europe,
Interpol, and OECD dating back to the 1980s in responding to the challenges of cyber
crime. One significant result of this collective effort was the publication of theUnitedNationsManual
onCybercrime31 and United Nations Resolution of 2001 which exhorted States, in the
context of an earlier UN Resolution on Millennium Goals—which recognized that the
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication technologies
are available to all—to ensure that their laws and practices eliminate safe havens
for those who criminally misuse information technologies; while also ensuring law
enforcement cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of international cases
of criminal misuse of information technologies which should be coordinated among
all concerned States. The Resolution went on to require that information should
be exchanged between States regarding the problems that they face in combating the
criminal misuse of information technologies and that law enforcement personnel should
be trained and equipped to address the criminal misuse of information technologies.
The Resolution recognized that legal systems should protect the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of data and computer systems from unauthorized impairment
and ensure that criminal abuse is penalized and that such systems should permit
the preservation of and quick access to electronic data pertaining to particular
criminal investigations. Itcalleduponmutualassistanceregimesto ensure the timely
investigation of the criminal misuse of information technologies and the timely
gathering and exchange of evidence in such cases. States were requested to make
the general public aware of the need to prevent and combat the criminal misuse of
information technologies. A significant clause in the Resolution called for information
technologies to be designed to help prevent and detect criminal misuse, trace criminals
and collect evidence to the extent practicable, recognizing that the fight against
the criminal misuse of information technologies required the development of solutions
taking into account both the protection of individual freedoms and privacy and the
preservation of the capacity of governments to fight such criminal misuse.
A seminal event in the international response to cybercrime occurred in 2001 with
the adoption of the Cybercrime Convention of the Council of Europe which was opened
for signature in November 2001 and came into force on 1 July 2004. The Convention
was ratified by President Bush on 22 September 2006 and entered into force for the
United States on 1 January 2007. The main concern of the Convention was the risk
that computer networks and electronic information may also be used for committing
criminal offences and that evidence relating to such offences may be stored and
transferred by these networks. States Parties to the Convention therefore expressed
their view—in a Preambular Clause to the Convention—that co-operation between States
and private industry in combating cybercrime was necessary and that there was a
need to protect legitimate interests in the use and development of information technologies.
The intent of the Convention can therefore be subsumed under three premises:
- Harmonising the domestic criminal substantive law elements of offences and connected
provisions in the area of cyber-crime;
- providing for domestic criminal procedural law powers necessary for the investigation
and prosecution of such offences as well as other offences committed by means of
a computer system or evidence in relation to which is in electronic form; and
- setting up a fast and effective regime of international co-operation.
The Convention in Article 2 requires each Party to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic
law, when committed intentionally, access to the whole or any part of acomputersystem
without right. The provision goes on to say that a Party may require that the offence
be committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer
data or with other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is
connected to another computer system. There are also provisions which call for States
Parties to adopt legislative or other measures to counter illegal inception of transmission
of computer data, data interception and exchange interception. Of particular significance
to aviation is Article 7 on alteration of data and forgery, which goes on to require
each Party to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish
as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without
right, the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data, resulting
in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal
purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly
readable and intelligible. The Provision concludes that a Party may require an intent
to defraud, or similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches.
Article 7 protects certain measures adopted by the aviation community to ensure
that the integrity of passports and other machine readable travel documents are
protected with technology such as the Public Key Directory (PKD). PKD is based on
a brand new technique known as quantum cryptography which is calculated to eliminate
the terrifying vulnerabilities that arise in the way digitally stored data are exposed
to fraudulent use. This new technique uses polarized photons instead of electronic
signals to transmit information along cables. Photons aretinyparticlesoflight that
are so sensitive that when intercepted, they immediately become corrupted. This
renders the message unintelligible and alerts both the sender and recipient to the
fraudulent or spying attempt. The use of a technique such as the public key directory
in passports is a good example. The public key directory is designed and proposed
to be used by customs and immigration authorities who check biometric details in
an electronic passport, and is based on cryptography which is already a viable tool
being actively considered by the aviation community as a fail-safe method for ensuring
the accuracy and integrity of passport information.
The use of biometric information for the identification of persons is another method
that counters cyber terrorism and interference of computer imagery. Biometrics target
the distinguishing physiological or behavioral traits of the individual by measuring
them and placing them in an automated repository such as machine encoded representations
created by computer software algorithms that could make comparisons with the actual
features. Physiological biometrics that have been found to successfully accommodate
this scientific process are facial recognition, fingerprinting and iris-recognition
as being the most appropriate. The biometric identification process is fourfold:
firstly involving the capture or acquisitionofthebiometricsample;secondly extracting
or converting the raw biometric sample obtained into an intermediate form; and thirdly
creating templates of the intermediate data is converted into a template for storage;
and finally is the comparison stage where the information offered by the travel
document with that which is stored in the reference template.
National Efforts : Interception of data is a critically offensive
act which serves as a precursor to cyber crime and cyber terrorism. The Cybercrime
Convention defines interception as: Listening to, monitoring or surveillance of
the content of communications, to the procuring of the content of data either directly,
through access and use of the computer system, or indirectly, through the use of
electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices.
Surveillance laws against interception in the United States have been somewhat ambivalent
until they underwent reform in 1986 with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) which was adopted prior to the introduction of the internet and the World
Wide Web. Courts have referred to such laws as convoluted and confusing and uncertain.
In the decision of Konop v Hawaian Airlines, handed down by the United States Court
of Appeal 9th Circuit in 2002, the Court notedinter alia that the ECPA defines “electronic
communication” as a “transfer” of signals, and that“unlike the definition of‘wire
communication,’ the definition of‘electronic communication’ does not include electronic
storage of such communications”, which drew the Court to the conclusion that the
Act was not equipped to handle modern forms of electronic communication.
In the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) of 2000
was a legislative attempt by Parliament to unify in a single legal framework provisions
responding to the interception of information and communications. RIPA does not
discriminate between types of communications or the location at which communications
are intercepted. Initially, in Section 1.1. RIPA provides that it is an offence
for a person intentionally and without lawful authority to intercept, at any place
in the United Kingdom, any communication in the course of its transmission by means
of a public postal service or a public telecommunication system. In Section 1.1.2.
RIPA prescribes it an offence for a person to intentionally and without lawful authority,
intercept at any location in the United Kingdom any communication while it is being
transmitted via a public or private telecommunications system. An important provision
is Section 4.1. which makes conduct by the interceptor lawful if the interception
of a communication in the course of its transmission by means of a telecommunication
system constitutes interception carried out for the purpose of obtaining information
about the communications of a person who, or who the interceptor has reasonable
grounds for believing, is in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.
Such interception would relate to the use of a telecommunications service provided
to persons in that country or territory whichiseitherapublictelecommunications service;
or a telecommunications service that would be a public telecommunications service
if the persons to whom it is offered or provided are members of the public in a
part of the United Kingdom.
Australia has adopted the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act of 1979
Section 7(1) of which provides that a person must not intercept, authorize, suffer
or permit another person to intercept or do any act, or thing that will enable him
or her or another person to intercept a communication passing over a telecommunications
system. A Key provision is Section 108 (1) which provides that a person commits
an offence if that person, with intent and knowledge accesses a stored communication
or authorises, suffers or permits another person to accesses a stored communication
or does any act or thing that will enable the person or another person to access
a stored communication where the intended recipient of the stored communication
or the person who sent the stored communication had no knowledge of the offender’s
act.
In Canada a Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2005 which was aimed at introducing
reforms to an ambivalent legislative structure dealing with unlawful interception
of documents and communications. In the absence of specific legislation one could
draw parallels in Canada’scriminallegislation,forexample in the Canadian Criminal
CodewhereSection184(1)providesthatanagentofthe State may intercept, by means of
any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, a private communication
if either the originator of the private communication or the person intended by
the originator to receive it has consented to the interception; or the agent of
the state believes on reasonable grounds that there is a risk of bodily harm to
the person who consented to the interception and he purpose of the interception
is to prevent the bodily harm. The provision goes on o require the agent of the
State who intercepts a private communication to, as soon as is practicable in the
circumstances,destroyanyrecordingoftheprivate communication that is obtained from
an interception, any full or partial transcript of the recording and any notes made
by that agent of the private communication, if nothing in the private communication
suggests that bodily harm, attempted bodily harm or threatened bodily harm has occurred
or is likely to occur. It is also important to note that Section 287(1)(b)providesthateveryonecommitstheftwho
fraudulently, maliciously,orwithoutcolourofrightusesanytelecommunication facility
or obtains any telecommunication service.
Conclusion : The particularity of cyber-terrorism is that the threat is enhanced
by globalization and the ubiquity of the Internet. It is a global problem in search
of a global solution and the only forum that could provide a global framework against
cyber terrorism is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This could
be achieved firstly through a sustained global process of security risk assessment.
At the 21st Aviation Security Panel Meeting of ICAO (AVSECP/21, 22 to 26 March 2010)
a new Recommended Practice related to cyber threats was proposed for adoption by
the Council as part of amendment 12 to Annex 17 (Security) to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). It was adopted on 17 November
2010, will become effective on 26 March 2011 and applicable on 1 July 2011. This
Recommended Practice suggests that each Contracting State develop measures in order
to protect information and communication technology systems used for civil aviation
purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation. At
the 22nd Meeting of the Panel, conducted by ICAO from 21 to 25 March 2011, the Panel
noted the value of vulnerability assessments pertaining to cyber security in aviation
whose objectives are to evaluate the efficiency of existing mitigation measures
and identify any vulnerabilities from a threat-based perspective and further noted
that better understanding of residual risks will support a State’s efforts to refine
its risk response.
In pursuance of this objective, a study could be undertaken by ICAO in collaboration
with its member States to identify critical aviation information systems; review
the effectiveness of existing mitigation measures established for critical aviation
information systems; identify any vulnerabilities in current security arrangements;
learn good practices on how to address these vulnerabilities; and determine how
to better manage the identified residual risks.
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Securing Asia 2013
June 17th - 18th, 2013
The Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, London
A two day meticulously planned Conference and Exhibition as the next step towards creating a forum for Asian Nations and Global Security Suppliers.
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